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is up-to-date on the latest changes in local, state, and federal laws and regulations.
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“[N]ature knows no legal boundaries, resources cannot be stopped by
walls, no matter how high some people want to build them because
borderlines expand on their own logic, they belong to many nations and
they are there for the responsible exploitation of their communities.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Offshore hydrocarbon resources have been developed for many decades, and with
technology improvements, many fields which were once impossible to develop, are now
economically and technologically feasible. This has led to a growing difficulty in
determining the legislative and regulatory framework for resources that straddle the
recognized borders between two states. In this paper, we examine a successful framework
agreement governing the transboundary resources between the United Kingdom (“U.K.”)
and Norway in the North Sea, and the agreement between the United States and Mexico
governing the Gulf of Mexico. Following the 2013 Energy Reform, the Mexican energy
sector has been revitalized, leading to greater exploration, development, and production
than ever before. This means that in the near future transboundary resources may be
licensed for production, bringing the issues highlighted in this paper to the attention of
multiple government and international entities. This paper seeks to recommend
improvements to the transboundary framework in the Gulf of Mexico based on the
successful framework agreement utilized in the North Sea.
This paper begins by introducing international law for offshore resources in Part II.
Part III discusses the offshore regulatory regimes in the U.K. and Norway, analyzing how
the two states have successfully used bilateral agreements to facilitate cooperation
regarding effective exploitation and apportionment of costs from cross-boundary offshore
oil and gas projects in the North Sea. Part IV discusses the offshore regulatory regimes in
the United States and Mexico and analyzes the current transboundary agreement in place
for the Gulf of Mexico. Part V compares the transboundary agreement governing the North
Sea and the same governing the Gulf of Mexico. We highlight the major differences in the
agreements and suggest changes to the Gulf of Mexico agreement based on the successful
North Sea agreement. Finally, this paper concludes and provides key policy
recommendations to improve the rules and regulations surrounding the exploitation of
transboundary hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Mexico.
1

Guillermo J. García Sánchez, Mexico’s Energy Reform and the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary
Agreement: An Opportunity for Efficient, Effective, and Safe Exploitation of the Gulf of Mexico, 9 SEA
GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1 (2018).
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II.

INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR OFFSHORE RESOURCES

Unlike resources on land, which belong to the country upon which they sit, the
ownership of offshore resources was not so easy to determine. The law of the seas
developed from struggles between states, who sought to expand their control over the
marine areas that were adjacent to their coastlines.2 Though it was well understood that
states had sovereignty over their territorial sea, the breadth of the territorial sea was only
considered to be three miles—the distance that a shore-based cannon could reach—and
therefore the distance that a coastal state could reasonably control.3 In 1949, following
World War II, the United Nations International Law Commission began preparing four
draft conventions that would provide a framework codifying international laws and
customs.4 The conventions, later known as the Geneva Conventions, were adopted at the
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in April 1958.5
To further develop the international law of the seas, in 1982 the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea created the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).6 UNCLOS divided the sea into distinct territorial zones,
each subject to a different legal status and applicable law.7 UNCLOS went into effect in
1994, and while 168 nations have since ratified the treaty, the United States is among those
who have not, stating UNCLOS is customary international law and is therefore binding.
UNCLOS establishes a State’s complete sovereignty in the sea extending out to twelve
nautical miles from the coast.8 The contiguous zone stretches to twenty-four nautical miles,
where the State may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of

2

Background to UNCLOS, CONT’L SHELF PROGRAMME, http://www.continentalshelf.org/about/1143.aspx
(last visited Apr. 8, 2018).

3

Id.

4

The Conventions included: (1) The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; (2) The
Convention on the High Seas; (3) The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas; and (4) The Convention on the Continental Shelf.
5

Background to UNCLOS, supra note 2.

6

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
7

Naama Hasson, Deep Water Offshore Oil Exploration Regulation: The Need for a Global Environmental
Regulation Regime 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 277, 281 (2013).
8

Id. at 28182.
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its customs, as well as fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulation.9 UNCLOS also
established that the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) of each State extends to 200
nautical miles, unless other states’ boundaries conflict with the measurement. If there are
conflicting boundaries, an EEZ boundary line equidistant from each State would be
determined. In the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, the maritime boundaries are
uncontroverted and well established having been ratified by state legislation.
III.

THE NORTH SEA

Since the 1960s, the States surrounding the North Sea have produced and regulated
the petroleum resources found below the seafloor. Five countries are entitled to develop
these resources—the U.K., Norway, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands.10 Each of
these independent states have legislation and regulations governing the licensing and
exploitation of their petroleum sector. Additionally, as with all production industries,
expansive health, safety, and environmental regulations have been promulgated by each
state. However, questions as to which laws and regulations govern an offshore
development occur with transboundary fields. This Section will discuss the North Sea, in
particular the U.K. petroleum industry and the transboundary agreement with Norway.

A. U.K. Oil and Gas Sector
1. Actors and Agencies and their interactions
Commercial exploitation of the vast oil reserves in the U.K. Continental Shelf
(“UKCS”) was enabled by the Continental Shelf Act of 1964, which vested all natural
resources found in the subsoil of the U.K. territorial waters (except for coal) in the crown.11
The Petroleum Act of 1998, establishes the regulatory regime for oil and gas exploration
and production in the U.K.12 The Petroleum Act is supplemented by the 2016 Energy Act,
the 2015 Infrastructure Act, and various other environmental, health, and safety legislative
and regulatory provisions.

9

Id. at 281. See also UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 33(2) (establishing the rights of a nation to engage in
zones contiguous to its territorial seas).

10

Though both Belgium and France do have exclusive economic zones in the North Sea, they do not
produce offshore oil.
11

Continental Shelf Act 1964, c. 29 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/29/contents.

12

Petroleum Act 1998, c. 17 § 2(1) (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/17/section/2.
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The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”) is
responsible for setting energy and climate change mitigation policies, and establishing the
framework for achieving the policy goals in those areas.13 The Oil and Gas Authority
(“OGA”) holds most regulatory functions for the U.K. oil and gas industry,14 including:
licensing and regulating the upstream sector; regulating the decommissioning of offshore
installations and pipelines; and enforcing environmental legislation as it applies to
upstream oil and gas activities.15 The OGA has the ability to participate in meetings with
operators, have access to data, and introduce a range of sanctions such as enforcement
notices and fines of up to £1 million.16 The Environment Agency; Health and Safety
Executive (“HSE”); Department of Energy & Climate Change; and Offshore Safety
Directive Regulator also play a role in regulating the U.K.’s offshore oil and gas industry.17
Alongside regulatory requirements, there are a number of voluntary industry-based
codes of practice to which many UKCS licensees have agreed. The Infrastructure Code of
Practice is a non-statutory code that sets out principles and procedures to guide all those
involved in negotiating third party access to oil and gas infrastructure on the UKCS.18 With
respect to transfers of licenses, the Commercial Code of Practice establishes an agreedupon framework to minimize resources spent on negotiations and promote positive
commercial behavior.19Companies engaging in oil activities through unincorporated joint
venture associations also look to the Oil & Gas U.K. (the oil industry representative body)
for guidance on contracts and compliance with relative law.20

13

Philip Mace et. al., Oil and Gas Regulation in the UK: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW
(Oct. 1, 2017), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-5245349?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default).
14

See DAVID HOUGH, UK OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 3, House of Commons Library No. CBP
07268 (2017).

15

See id.

16

See OGA Corporate Plan 2016-2021, OIL & GAS AUTHORITY (Mar. 2017),
https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media /1019/oga_corporate_plan_march_17th.pdf.
17

Mace et. al., supra note 13.

18

Code of Practice on Access to Upstream Oil and Gas Infrastructure on the UK Continental Shelf – ICOP
Guidance Notes, OIL & GAS UK (Aug. 2017), https://oilandgasus.co.uk/product/infrastructure-code-ofpractice-icop-and-accompanying-guidance-notes.

19

Bob Palmer, Oil Regulation: United Kingdom, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (July 2018),
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/24/jurisdiction/22/oil-regulation-2017-united-kingdom/.

20

Id.

4

In 2016, the U.K. enacted the Maximising Economic Recovery of U.K. Petroleum
Strategy (“MER UK”), which brings together the government, industry, and the OGA to
maximize economic recovery from the UKCS and the value from the U.K.’s oil and gas
industry as a whole.21
2. Licensing
The Petroleum Act of 1998 lays out the licensing structure for petroleum fields that
is currently used today.22 Licensing power is placed with the Secretary of State which,
through the OGA and “on behalf of Her Majesty, may grant to such persons as he thinks
fit licenses to search and bore for and get petroleum to which this section applies.”23
The OGA has the power to grant licenses so that companies can explore and
produce petroleum resources. A company can be deemed fit for either an exploration
license, which allows for exploration alone, or an exploration and production license,
allowing for both activities.24 The OGA approves licenses based on the company’s
financial viability and capacity, tax risk, presence in the U.K., and representation by a law
firm authorized to act within the jurisdiction.25 If all the requirements are met, the company
can bid on “blocks” during one of the annual licensing rounds, and the winning company
has exclusive rights to utilize that area to profit from oil and gas production.26 Under the
MER UK strategy, where an operator is not able to ensure maximum recovery, the state
may require the operator to relinquish the related licenses or infrastructure after a
reasonable period of time by divesting itself of the license or asset “to other financially and
technically competent persons.”27
After winning the bid, and as a part of the license application process, the potential
operator must include a work programme and a safety case. The programme outlines the
21

See Guidance on Fracking: Developing Shale Gas in the UK, DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY AND INDUS.
STRATEGY, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/about-shale-gas-and-hydraulic-fracturingfracking/developing-shale-oil-and-gas-in-the-uk (last updated Oct. 11, 2018).
22

Petroleum Act 1998, c. 17 § 2(1) (UK).

23

Petroleum Bill 1997-8, HL Bill [153] cl. 3.1 (UK). See also Mace et. al., supra note 13.

24

Licensee Criteria, OIL AND GAS AUTHORITY, https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/licensingconsents/licensing-system/licensee-criteria/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). See also Overview, OIL AND GAS
AUTHORITY, https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/licensing-consents/overview/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
25

Licensee Criteria, supra note 24.

26

Id.

27

Mace et. al., supra note 13.
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minimum work obligations that an applicant must carry out if awarded the license.28 The
work obligations generally contain: exploration terms and seismic survey requirements;
specific timelines for construction and production; when drilling must begin; the required
number of hard “guaranteed” wells; and more.29
The work programme uses a self-regulated, non-prescriptive approach, meaning it
allows a company to set many of their own standards, as long as they meet the minimum
requirements. This approach, compared to a more traditional “check the boxes” approach
found in the United States, allows smaller companies wanting to get involved in the
industry an opportunity to bid competitively. It also allows all companies to individualize
the drilling process to meet their methods and particular needs.
This licensing regime has allowed the U.K. to contract with diverse commercial
operators to explore and produce petroleum. To exploit the resources for the betterment of
the State, lessors of blocks own the resource once it is extracted and at that point the Crown
is due a low royalty from the operator, such as 12.5%; applicable government taxes; and a
nominal area rental charge of ￡2000 annually (roughly $2,600).30
3. Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulations
Health and safety regulations of offshore drilling in the North Sea are interrelated
with the overall environmental regulatory scheme. Countless entities play a role in ensuring
safe drilling practices and the regulatory scheme has taken many approaches and shapes
over time. Below is an overview of the chronological shift in each regulatory approach,
showcasing the evolution of the goals of health, safety, and environmental regulations.
a) Early Regulations and Pre-Piper Alpha
Most of the major changes in environmental and health and safety regulations in
the North Sea have been sparked by disasters exposing weaknesses and vulnerabilities in
the then-current regulatory regime. The first such incident was in 1965, when metal fatigue
28

See Guidance on the Management of Offshore License Work Programme Commitments, pg. 2, OIL &
GAS AUTHORITY (Jan. 2018), https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/media/4526/firm-wells.pdf.
29

Presentation by David Smith, Associate; Laura Fraser, Associate; Victoria Wallace, Solicitor; & Victoria
Blair, Trainee Solicitor, of Burness Paull, LLP, Aberdeen, Scotland, at the University of Aberdeen as part
of the Texas A&M University School of Law Global Programs (May 9, 2018).

30

HOUGH, supra note 14, at 12.
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caused the BP Sea Gem to become the first operational oil-well to sink in the North Sea,
leaving thirteen men dead.31 At the time of the Sea Gem incident, health and safety were
primarily regulated through a relatively “light-touch” self-regulating approach with
individual contractual agreements between operators.32 The Sea Gem disaster
demonstrated the inadequacy of the North Sea’s health and safety regulations and led to
the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act of 1971, which created a framework for
the new “prescriptive approach” of health and safety regulations that would be
implemented over the course of the next nine years.33
The prescriptive approach required comprehensive guides detailing strict
acceptance criteria to meet the regulatory requirements. Under this regime, the Department
of Energy34 prescribed a specific set of criteria defining new safety requirements that all
licensees were required to meet.35 This approach, however, proved to be ineffective and
too far removed from realistic operations and had little effect on the industry, as evidenced
by the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988.36
The Piper Alpha disaster was caused by a lack of communication following a shift
change, coupled with the lack of serious safety procedures, and led to the explosion of what
was once the biggest oil and gas producing platform in the North Sea causing the death of
167 workers on-board. Following the tragedy, the government commissioned a Scottish
judge, Lord Cullen, to lead a Public Inquiry in to the deaths, resulting in a report
recommending 106 changes to safety regulations in the North Sea. The report also resulted
in the transfer of health and safety regulatory responsibility from the Department of Energy
to the HSE. Until then, the Department of Energy was responsible for regulating health,
31

Deepwater Horizon and Modern Offshore Drilling Disasters, OFFSHORE TECH. (May 6, 2010),
https://www. offshore-technology.com/features/feature84417/.

32

Regulatory Regimes: Norway, United Kingdom, United States, and Australia, in RISK GOVERNANCE OF
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS 101240 (Preben Hempel Lindøe, Michael Baram, & Ortwin Renn
eds., 2013), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198301.023.
33

Id.; see also MINISTRY OF POWER, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT TO THE
DRILLING RIG SEA GEM, 1967, Cmnd. 3409 (UK).
34

“Note that at this time the Department of Energy had responsibility not only for licensing and
environmental regulation but also for health and safety offshore.” John Paterson, Health, Safety and
Environmental Regulation on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf in the Aftermath of the Macondo
Disaster, 4 LA. ST. U. J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 259, 262 n.11 (2016).
35

Id. at 262.

36

Id.; For additional reading about the Piper Alpha disaster, see The Case for Safety: The North Sea Piper
Alpha Disaster, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (May 2013), https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/defaultsource/safety-messages/safetymessage-2013-05-06-piperalpha.pdf?sfvrsn=3daf1ef8_6.

7

safety, and environmental standards, and was also responsible for maximizing
production—a direct conflict of interest.37
b) Post-Piper Alpha Regulations: the “Safety Case” Approach
Lord Cullen’s Report also resulted in the U.K. abandoning “the prescriptive
regulatory approach in favor of a goal-setting approach.”38 During this era of regulation,
the “safety-case” regime took hold with a goal of again enhancing the health and safety
regulations and also incorporating heightened environmental regulations.39 The safety case
approach focuses on “goal-setting” regulation, abandoning specific safety rules developed
by government agencies and instead, placing key responsibilities on oil and gas operators.40
A safety case is a “structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides
compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for given application in a
given operating environment.”41
The safety case regulations are flexible, allowing operators to maintain the choice
of technology and systems to meet safety standards. This unique approach recognizes that
the oil and gas industry, with its advanced technological innovations, will always have
superior knowledge and expertise to government regulators, and as such, safety regulations

37

Presentation by Rona Jamieson, Partner, and Lynne Gray, Director, Burness Paull, in Aberdeen,
Scotland, at the University of Aberdeen as part of the Texas A&M University School of Law Global
Programs (May 10, 2018).

38

Paterson, supra note 34, at 263. See also Offshore Installations (Management and Administration)
Regulations, 1995, SI 1995/738 (UK); Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response) Regulations, 1995, SI 1995/743 (UK); Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and
Construction, etc.) Regulations, 1996, SI 1996/913 (UK); Pipelines Safety Regulations, 1996, SI 1996/825
(UK); Diving at Work Regulations, 1997, SI 1997/2776 (UK); Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment
Regulations, 1998, SI 1998/2307 (UK).

39

Hasson, supra note 7, at 297. “[I]t was from [the Piper Alpha disaster] that the whole concept of the
safety case came and the whole concept of independent verification and inspection.” ENERGY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITTEE, UK DEEPWATER DRILLING—IMPLICATIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL
SPILL, 2010-11, HC 450-I, at 9 (UK),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/450/450i.pdf.
40

Hasson, supra note 7, at 297. See also John Paterson, The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in
Occupational Health and Safety Offshore, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 369, 371–84 (2011) (detailing the
formation of the UK’s safety approach).
41

JAMES R. INGE, THE SAFETY CASE, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND USE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 2 (2007),
http://safety. inge.org.uk/20070625-Inge2007_The_Safety_Case-U.pdf.
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will never be able to provide a “comprehensive code covering all aspects of the industry.”42
An operator or owner of an installation must prepare a written safety case demonstrating
the duty holder’s ability and means to control major accident hazards to an extent
acceptable to the HSE. The safety case is specific to an installation and the duty holder
must ensure that the installation operates only once until the regulator accepts the safety
case.
After a license is granted and the safety case is accepted and implemented, the
operator is then responsible to self-regulate the installation based on the information,
guidelines, and standards in its safety case.43 The HSE enforce breaches of legislation and
regulations relevant to health and safety matters. Liability is criminal and sanctions include
fines and imprisonment for individuals. The OGA has the power remove and operator or
revoke a license when conditions are not met. The safety case is implemented in
transboundary fields as well. It is the system in place for the pads, installations, and
activities on the U.K. side of the border, and if the field expands beyond the border, the
operators in that field must adhere to the standards in their safety case as well as the
standards the other country sets.44 In practice, the operator applies whichever standard is
stricter to all operations.
The safety case regime favors practicality and individuality over heavy-handed
legislation and regulation, and is seen internationally as the “U.K. approach.”45 It has been
adopted by other industries and in other parts of the world—Norway adopted a similar
approach, and the EU issued the “Offshore Safety Directive” in which it mandated selfregulation of drilling companies, as long as they met certain safety goals.46
4. Contracts
Though there are many types of contractual relationships entered into in the oil and
gas industry, one common contractual relationship used in offshore production, especially
in the North Sea, bares notation; and that is the Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”).47 A
42

Hasson, supra note 7, at 297; Paterson, supra note 40.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Other types of contractual agreements are: Joint ventures, service contracts, and profit-sharing,
production sharing, and unitization.
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JOA, is an agreement between two or more companies where they collaborate to share their
financial and technical resources, as well as expertise, to more efficiently explore, develop,
and produce hydrocarbons from the leasehold.48 One key feature of a JOA is that, though
the resources are jointly owned and exploited, one company is designated as the operator
of an offshore development and has a working interest in the lease.49 Operator
responsibility normally goes to the company with the largest equity interest in the license,
but not always as a company with greater expertise in exploration and production in the
particular field or formation might be selected regardless of their percentage ownership.
Whichever company is chosen as the operator is then responsible for the day to day
operations on the platform, such as on-site safety, drilling decisions, and management of
employees and sub-contractors.50 A JOA allows companies to split financial risks, profits,
and costs of a well, while acknowledging that the operator will handle the operation.51
While a JOA often places risk of liability for accidents on the Operator in a typical UKCS
JOA, the operator is indemnified and held harmless by the non-operated parties for any claims that
may arise out of joint operations conducted by the operator.52 The idea being that the operator does
not suffer any extra loss--nor any obtain any extra gain--as a result of undertaking the role as
operator of the joint venture that a non-operator would not suffer.53

In the North Sea, agreement between the interest owners—such as JOA’s,
Decommissioning Security Agreements, Proximity Agreements, and Crossing
Agreements—are drafted using OGUK model form agreements.54 Model forms are also
used for service agreements between operators and sub-contractors; one popular provider
of form service contracts between operators and service companies sub-contractors is
LOGIC.55 LOGIC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Oil & Gas U.K., is a non-profit
organization whose goal is to increase efficiency of oil and gas production in the UKCS.
48

Joint Operating Agreement-JOA, PETROPEDIA, https://www.petropedia.com/definition/7062/jointoperating-agreement-joa (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
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Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, UK: The Joint Operating Agreement, MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x /298684/Corporate+Governance/The+Joint+Operating+Agreement (last
updated Mar. 12, 2014).

52

Presentation by David Smith, Laura Fraser, Victoria Wallace, & Victoria Blair, supra note 29.
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55

Standard Contracts, LOGIC, https://www.logic-oil.com/standard-contracts (last visited Nov. 16, 2018);
Presentation by David Smith, Laura Fraser, Victoria Wallace, & Victoria Blair, supra note 29.
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JOA’s merit discussion for two reasons: their relationship to the licensing regime
and their distinction from unitization agreements, which are discussed at length in other
sections of this paper. A consortium of various companies will enter a JOA prior to the
licensing procedures described in Section 2 above. Therefore, it is very common for a
license to be granted, not to one company, but to a consortium organized under a JOA.56
To understand the interactions among parties in oil and gas transactions, it is important to
understand that a “licensee” is more often than not a group of companies, each having their
own management structure and internal procedures. Additionally, unitization agreements
and JOA’s have very important distinctions. Unitization will take place when two licensed
areas are exploited as a single unit so that the formation will be more efficiently produced.57
This normally occurs when the hydrocarbon formation extends between multiple blocks.58
In short terms, a unitization agreement governs the conjoined actions of multiple licensees
to multiple blocks; whereas a JOA governs the actions of one “licensee” that just happens
to be multiple companies working together in a single block under a single license.
Therefore, it is very common for two “licensees”—that are each a separate consortium of
companies governed by a JOA—to unitize their respective blocks under a unitization
agreement.
5. Conflict Resolution
English law governs most modern U.K. oil and gas contracts and generally provides
for arbitration as the main form of dispute resolution. However, some contracts may
specifically state that the transaction is to be governed by Scottish law. Both Scottish law
and English law are quite similar regarding dispute resolution for oil and gas agreements;59
however, because Scottish law is a mix of both common law and civil law, there are some
fundamental differences.60 These differences, can be differentiated by a court if the parties

56

Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, supra note 51.

57

Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Unitisation—The Oil and Gas Industry’s Solution to One of Geology’s
Many Conundrums, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 9, 2014),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=69912ce0-127d-447e-8a47-50f5d235dcfa.
58
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plead for the court to make the distinction as the Scottish courts may hear evidence as to
the applicability of English law.61
Although there are applicable laws that lay out the dispute resolution methods for
oil and gas disputes, the common practice in the North Sea heavily involves negotiations
and collaboration over litigation.62 Oil and gas companies will usually negotiate amongst
themselves to resolve disputes. “The vast majority of dispute resolution clauses we see in
contracts require the managing directors/ CEO’s of the parties in dispute to meet each other
to try to negotiate in good faith before formal action.”63 Due to the existing relationships
amongst the companies, and high likelihood of future involvements in other wells in the
North Sea, “these negotiations often result in settlements because such persons tend to be
very commercial in outlook” and neither party has a desire to commit the time and
resources required for litigation or arbitration.64 This process of good faith, non-formal
negotiation is memorialized by “documentation by lawyers with the usual discharges of
claim, non-admission of liability and ‘without prejudice’ wording.”65
a) Alternative Dispute Resolution
The Scottish courts, which under certain agreements might have jurisdiction over
conflicts between parties, have been reluctant to enforce mediation and other types of
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) based on the policy that dispute resolution should
be voluntary instead of mandatory. However, England is “encouraging” parties to, at the
very least, attempt ADR prior to commencing or continuing court action “under pain of
being penalised in costs if they do not.”66 There is a push in Scotland to encourage parties
to attempt ADR as well. In early 2018, the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee held
evidence sessions to discuss the importance of encouraging ADR as a cheaper, more

61
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Presentation by Neil Smith, Partner & Steven Guild, Partner, Burness Paull, in Aberdeen, Scotland, at the
University of Aberdeen as part of the Texas A&M University School of Law Global Programs (May 11,
2018).
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SCOTLAND 16 (2018), https://sp-bpr-en-prodcdnep.azureedge.net/published/J/2018/10/1/I-won-t-see-you-in-court--alternative-dispute-resolution-inScotland/JS052018R9.pdf. See also E-mail from Steven Guild, supra note 60.
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efficient means of settling disputes.67 Though the Committee concluded that “people
should not be compelled to participate in [ADR]” as to do so “could undermine the benefits
derived from the voluntary nature of ADR,” they also concluded that something needs to
be done to encourage participation.68 The Committee recommended that mandatory ADR
information meetings should be initiated to inform parties of their ADR options.69
Most disputes, especially in the oil and gas industry, are resolved through
cooperation; however, if the parties fail to reach a settlement and formal legal proceedings
are necessary to resolve the dispute, then arbitration or litigation will likely be initiated.70
In older North Sea contracts, litigation is the method of choice. However, arbitration has
begun to become more common, especially in the context of the hydrocarbons sector.71
The arbitration process begins by appointing an arbitrator, a process which is often stated
in the agreement’s dispute resolution clause. Wide discretion is given to the arbitrator to
decide the process, including time frame, for the following arbitration, as long as the
process is within the confines of the agreement and the applicable arbitration rules.72
Scottish Arbitration Rules are relatively new (2010) and were not in place for a majority
of the development of the North Sea.73 As is typical of most arbitration rules, the Scottish
Arbitration Rules obligate the arbitrator to ensure the arbitration proceeds expeditiously,
although there is no real way of enforcing this requirement in practice.74
b) Litigation
As mentioned above, when parties are unable to resolve conflicts amongst
themselves, they often turn to the courts to resolve the dispute. In Scotland litigation is the
preferred method to resolving disputes and is utilized about 80% of the time.75 As many of
the contracts governing U.K. oil and gas relationships were entered into prior to the rise or
ADR, and codification of arbitration rules, the agreements often provide for litigation
67
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instead of arbitration, or lack an ADR clause thus automatically granting jurisdiction to the
courts.76
Following a growing practice worldwide, the Scottish courts expect the parties to
have previously discussed the dispute and possible claims and defenses, and attempted to
settle the dispute through non-litigation means such as negotiation or mediation. However,
because the legal culture in both Scotland and the U.K. is that mandatory ADR impedes
peoples access to the court, even as a pretext to litigation ADR is only optional.77 The judge
does have the ability to place monetary penalties, or apportion attorney fees, according to
a side’s failure to accept an invitation to participate in ADR.78 The judges involved in
litigation, under both English law and Scottish law, are bound and empowered to establish
strict timetables to ensure expeditious progress of the cases before them.79
B. Norway Oil and Gas Sector
Hydrocarbons have been produced on the Norwegian continental shelf (“NCS”)
since 1971.80 Like the U.K., all petroleum resources on the NCS are vested in the
Norwegian state.81 The Petroleum Act is the main statute providing the legal framework
for petroleum activities on the NCS.82 The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (“MPE”) and
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (“NPD”) are the main regulatory bodies responsible
for regulating petroleum resource management and storage and transport of CO2 on the
continental shelf.83 Other key regulators responsible for petroleum activities on the NCS
include the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; the Ministry of
Climate and Environment; and the Ministry of Trade.84
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Notably, Norway as a state plays a key role in implementing government laws and
regulations through its state-owned companies. For example, the MPE is responsible for
the independent state-owned companies Petoro, Gassco, Statnett, Enova and Gassnova,85
and the agency holds a 67% ownership interest in Equinor (formerly Statoil), which is the
leading operator in the NCS.86 Norway has separate licensing, health and safety, and
environmental regulations; however this paper will not discuss those in detail as it is
beyond the scope of our research.
C. Transboundary Resources: U.K./Norway Framework Agreement

Oil and Gas fields close to the boundary line in the North Sea.87
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Wholly-Owned Companies, MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY (July 20, 2016),
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1. Actors and Agencies and their Interactions
Prior to 2005, the U.K. and Norway operated under individual bilateral agreements
specific to each transboundary oil field in the North Sea, such as the Frigg field.88 Aiming
to avoid the need for multiple field-specific treaties, the U.K. and Norway created a
working group focused on increasing cooperation between the nations and generating a
stable regulatory environment for investors. Ultimately, the working group recommended
the creation of a Framework Treaty and a set of parallel guidelines (collectively the
“Framework Agreement”).89 The working group estimated that the potential profits from
cooperative efforts could be $2 billion by 2010.90 In 2005, the U.K., Northern Ireland, and
Norway signed the Framework Agreement to encourage cross-boundary cooperation
regarding effective exploitation and apportionment of costs.91
To supplement the U.K./Norway Framework Agreement the countries jointly
issued guidelines.92 According to OGA, the guidelines “are designed to help companies
through the process of seeking government approval for the development of transboundary
reservoirs that extend across the median line between the U.K. and Norway.”93 The
guidelines break down the practical steps to completing various phases of offshore projects
and provides references and links to both U.K. and Norwegian legislation and guidance.94
The document also explains the roles of licensees and operators and their relationship to
the Regulatory Authorities in U.K./Norway.95
88
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Some of the benefits of the Framework Agreement have already taken place in the
form of the Enoch and Blane fields, which were the first transboundary developments
approved under the agreement.96 Also, investments in the region have continued to rise as
GlobalData estimates there will be $43.1 billion worth of new North Sea project investment
between 2018 and 2025.97
2. Licensee Requirements and Unitization
As a reflection of the good diplomatic relationship between the states and the clarity
provided by the Framework Agreement, transboundary resources in the North Sea are often
allocated between states based on the processes outlined in the Framework Agreement
without extensive conflict.98
“If, as a result of geological/geophysical mapping, a petroleum structure is
considered to extend across the delimitation line and the licensees want to start
development then the operating company, acting on behalf of their co-licensees, will
inform the authorities of its home country,” NPD for Norway and the OGA for the U.K.99
The agencies will review geological surveys of the petroleum formation to determine its
nature and shape. The licensees will also start technical discussions aimed at agreeing to a
possible timetable for development.100 Importantly, both “Governments shall use their best
efforts to facilitate CrossBoundary Projects and shall not prevent or impede such projects
by unreasonably withholding Authorisations. The two Governments shall coordinate their
relevant Authorisation procedures and where both Governments issue Authorisations they
shall be given simultaneously, unless agreed otherwise, and shall be compatible with each
other.”101
96
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Per the Framework Agreement, if after initial consultations between the
government and their licensee both governments agree that a petroleum reservoir is
transboundary, it shall be exploited as a single unit.102 To effectuate this, a unit operator—
who will be responsible for coordinating development contacts with both governments—
will be appointed and approved by agreement between the licensees and both
governments.103 The licensees of both states will hold joint meetings to review the
geological, seismic, and technical data and to clarify technical issues. The licensees will
then prepare and draft Joint Development Plan and a Licensees’ Agreement.104 If on one
side of the boundary line, a license has not been awarded, the applicable state authority will
represent that area during this process until a license is awarded and all reasonable efforts
will be made to award a license for the area as soon as possible.105
The Licensees’ Agreement normally takes the form of a Unitization and Unit
Operating Agreement (“UUOA”). In the basic sense, a UUOA is an agreement between all
mineral interest owners and lessees of the transboundary blocks that combines the interests
of all owners for production purposes.106 A field is unitized for greater efficiency as it is
more cost-effective to work together to produce the field than to fight over the allocation
of the resource or force both sides to drill separate wells into the same reservoir. The
hydrocarbons produced, or the sum gathered from selling the resources, are divided among
the interest holders according to the allocation of the resources in the formation between
the states—for example 60% in the U.K. and 40% in Norway.107 A UUOA typically results
in a unit whereby each participant’s share of the costs, liabilities, and production is based
102
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on its proportionate share of the field, regardless of the location of facilities.108 The key
terms of a UUOA are the creation of the unit; determination of participations;
redetermination requirements;109 unit operating committee procedures and voting; non-unit
operations; and the use of facilities, whether current or newly constructed.110
According to the Framework Agreement, the Licensees’ Agreement will contain
the terms for joint operations, procedures, protocols, and agreements. These will usually
include such procedures as appointment/approval of the Unit Operator, determination of
reserves, appointment of expert, etc.111 The Licensees’ Agreement will be subject to
approval by both Governments.112 “The Agreement should identify the limits of the
petroleum structure and include proposals for determining the extent of the proposed field,
the hydrocarbons initially in place, the method of calculation, and the distribution of the
reserves between the licensees on each side of the delimitation line.”113
Along with the Licensees’ Agreement, the Unit Operator must submit a joint
Development Plan, which is labeled differently depending on the state in which drilling
facilities sit.114 A U.K. Field Development Plan (“FDP”) will be drafted if the facilities are
wholly located on the U.K. side of the maritime boundary, and a Norwegian Plan for
Development and Operation (“PDO”) and Plan for Installation and Operation will be
drafted if the installations are wholly located on the Norwegian side.115 If the facilities are
located on both sides of the boundary, a composite plan will be needed. Whatever type of
agreement is used, it will need to meet the requirements of both states. For example, a PDO
108
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consists of the Plan itself and an impact assessment; however, this is not required in a U.K.
FDP.116 But, in any transboundary field being developed between the U.K. and Norway,
an impact assessment will need to be included in order to satisfy the Norwegian
requirement. Finally, both a Norwegian production permit and a U.K. production consent
will be required before production can commence.117
3. Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulations
Regarding health, safety, and environmental regulations, the states shall
“encourage, where possible, the adoption of common health, safety and environmental
standards and requirements. In any event, the two Governments shall seek to ensure that
their respective standards and requirements are compatible . . . .”118 In addition to
cooperation regarding the adoption of regulations and standards, the two Governments also
agree to cooperate regarding inspections and allowing access to health, safety, and
environmental reports.119 The Framework Agreement provides security that the states will
work together regarding the creation and enforcement of regulations; however, the actual
governing regulations are those of the host country themselves. To be clear what
regulations apply, the Operator would need to confirm with the applicable state agency.
4. Conflict Resolution
The Framework Agreement also includes dispute resolution processes related to
the distribution of the petroleum resources.120 Additionally, the Framework Agreement
provides methods to resolve disputes between the licensees, between licensees and
contractors, and disputes between the two United Kingdom an Norway.121
The Framework Agreement sets forth processes to resolve the following: issues
involving compliance with terms and conditions laid out in contracts and transaction
paperwork; tariff concerns between the companies involved; and disputes relating to
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transboundary access.122 The different sets of disputes have separate resolution types,
placing the burden of dispute resolution in the hands of the government most equipped to
make the best decision based on guidelines set out previously in the agreement. Certain
dispute types require both governments to resolve the issue together, encouraging haste
due to the necessity of a speedy resolution.123
In the event that the governments fail to reach an agreement on the “interpretation
or application of the Agreement, the duty of resolution will fall to the Conciliation Board,”
which consists of five members.124 “Each Government shall designate two members, and
the four members so designated shall designate the fifth member (who shall be a national
of or habitually reside in the United Kingdom or in the Kingdom of Norway) who will act
as the Chairman of the Conciliation Board.”125 The Framework Agreement also sets forth
an amount of time allowed to each Government to designate said members, and if either
Government fails to appoint a member in that time, the designation will then be the
obligation of the President of the International Court of Justice.126
The actual dispute resolution is not under a time limit and the board is allotted a
“reasonable time limit to reach a decision (taking into account the need for a speedy
resolution).”127 The Board shall also be entitled to “all relevant information and may carry
out necessary consultations.”128
The laid-out specifics of the Conciliation Board and the processes for handling
conflicts make a clear determination for dispute resolution, but the discretion left to the
board in the form of unspecified time frames and the types of materials they are allowed
when handling disputes may lead to more differences in interpretation and basic
disagreements. Allowing the Board a “reasonable amount of time” and “all relevant
information . . . necessary” creates more points of dispute and opens the door for future
disagreements regarding appropriate action by the board.129 This process for the
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Conciliation Board, although involving the U.K. and Norway, is not commonly followed
outside of Norway. “In the U.K., parties are pretty much free to proceed as they see fit.”130

IV.

THE GULF OF MEXICO

The Gulf of Mexico is the “ninth largest body of water in the world” and its
shoreline comprises “3,540 miles along the nations of the United States, Mexico, and
Cuba,” all of which have the right to explore and develop the resources located therein.131
The predominant activity in the Gulf is hydrocarbon development. There are currently
“[m]ore than 3,500 structures and 33,000 miles of offshore pipelines” in the area, making
it “the most extensively developed offshore production area in the world.”132 This Section
will analyze the agencies, legislation, and regulations governing the licensing and
exploitation of U.S. and Mexican petroleum sectors. It will then introduce and analyze the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States
Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico (“2012
Agreement”).
A. Mexico Oil and Gas Sector
1. Actors and Agencies and their Interactions
a) Executive Figures and the 2013 Mexico Energy Reform
In 1938, under President Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexico expropriated all foreign
investments and actors involved in the hydrocarbons sector, leading to a national
monopoly.133 Following the 2012 election of President Enrique Peño Nieto, the energy
sector re-opened to private and international investment and participation.134 The
130
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December 20th, 2013 enactment of the Constitutional Reform in Energy Matters (the
“Energy Reform”) substantially affected the oil and gas exploration and extraction industry
in the Gulf of Mexico.135 While the Energy Reform led to much change in the oil and gas
industry, both domestically in Mexico and on the international level,136 one unchanged
circumstance is that the Mexican Government continues to have sole ownership of
underground resources.137

The goals of the Energy Reform.138
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Prior to the Energy Reform, private companies were excluded from direct
involvement the exploration and extraction phases of the oil and gas industry in Mexico.139
The state owned company Petróleos Mexicanos (“PEMEX”) was the only company
allowed to conduct hydrocarbon activities: this included exploration and extraction for
underground resources, as well as any imports of oil products.140 Due to the inefficiency,
corruption, and heavy taxation of PEMEX, production was falling uncontrollably. As of
2015, Mexico reported 13 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, a 21% decline from 2014;
additionally, production from Cantarell, Mexico’s largest oil field, had fallen 80% since
2004.141 Oil production had begun a decade-long decline, falling by almost 1 million
barrels per day by 2015; natural gas production was also declining, resulting in increased
imports from the U.S.142 It was these declining figures that spawned the Energy Reform.
The Energy Reform resulted in amendments to Articles 25, 27, and 28 of Mexico’s
Federal Constitution; issuance of 22 secondary laws and regulations; and creation of new
government regulatory bodies.143 These changes allow for exploration and extraction of
hydrocarbons via companies other than PEMEX, including other international oil
companies like Chevron and Shell, as well as national oil companies from different states
like Venezuela or China.144 To manage national revenues from these varied exploration
and extraction activities, the Energy Reform created the Mexican Petroleum Fund for
Stabilization and Development.145 Both the National Hydrocarbons Commission and the
Energy Regulatory Commission were strengthened “. . . for the better development of the
national energy sector,” and the National Natural Gas Control Center was set to “. . . be
created as a public body in charge of efficiently operating the national system of
transportation and storage of natural gas pipelines.”146 A newly-created, decentralized
agency was also deemed necessary for regulating and supervising “. . . the activities of the
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hydrocarbon sector in terms of industrial safety and protection of the environment.”147 In
short, the 2013 Energy Reform intended to affect (1) hydrocarbon activities for PEMEX
and privately owned companies both upstream and downstream on domestic and
international levels; and (2) governmental oversight of such activities, on all fronts.148
On July 1, 2018, Mexico elected Andrés Manuel López Obrador as the new
President. President elect López Obrador, has made it known that he intends to reevaluate
the Energy Reform and wants to make sure that a licensing structure is in the best interest
of Mexico.149 López Obrador is a longtime advocate for a nationalist approach to Mexico’s
economic development and its abundant natural resources, and even used his opposition to
the reform as the centerpiece for previous elections and attempted to launch a national
referendum to stop the reform.150 The National Regeneration Movement party and coalition
partners now control not only the Presidency, but also both chambers of Congress giving
them significant power to change legislation.151
“President-elect López Obrador has identified four energy policy priorities: 1)
increase domestic oil and gas production; 2) refurbish PEMEX’s six existing refineries; 3)
construct a new refinery in the State of Tabasco; and 4) increase electricity generation,
mainly by updating existing hydroelectric plants.”152 However, the President-elect has
stated in reference to the contracts signed for blocks already licensed, “We won’t act in an
arbitrary fashion, nor will there be confiscation or any expropriation.”153 Only time will
tell what changes—such as a shifts away from licenses to joint-production agreements or
profit-sharing agreements—will occur under the new administration.
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b) Primary State Actor: PEMEX
As the monopolistic Mexican oil and gas industry actor since its inception in 1938
until the 2013 Energy Reform, PEMEX broadly operated under two umbrellas: domestic
and international.154 This reflects the fact that PEMEX was, and continues to be, involved
in every phase of the oil and gas industry,155 and thus is a primary Mexican actor in the
domestic and international oil and gas market.156 PEMEX continues to sell, buy and
transport oil products in the international market via trading companies.157 In this way, the
operations of PEMEX International were untouched by the Energy Reform.158
Prior to the Energy Reform, the ineffectiveness of PEMEX was caused by many
things including heavy taxation, a strong labor union, and overstaffing and corruption. Prior
to the reform, PEMEX was heavily taxed providing up to one-third of government revenue;
“by the 1980s the company was taxed at 69% of its total income.”159 Because of this heavy
tax burden, PEMEX’s resources for increasing exploration and downstream investment
were limited. PEMEX was also controlled by the oil workers’ labor union. Most oil
workers were represented by the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República
Mexicana, which held significant power in PEMEX by commanding high salaries, medical
care, and other benefits that earned them the reputation of an “aristocracy of labor” by the
rest of Mexican society.160 Lastly, PEMEX was inefficiently overstaffed and managed.
“Between 1989 and 1995 Pemex cut its staff nearly in half, though it still had more
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employees than firms such as Exxon, which generated 5 times Pemex’s revenue.”161 On
his first day as CEO at PEMEX, José Antonio González Anaya met inefficiency and
corruption head-on when he saved the company 3 billion pesos with one decision by
cancelling a contract upon realizing that the 50,000 computers PEMEX was buying had a
100% markup.162
While PEMEX remains a prominent actor, the legislative changes of the Energy
Reform directly and significantly affected PEMEX. Not only did PEMEX undergo
corporate restructuring, but in October 2014 PEMEX transformed “from a decentralized
public entity to a productive state-owned company.”163 In this new role PEMEX would
seemingly become more of a competitor on a level playing field competing with other
companies for rights such as those for exploration and production; but in what is commonly
referred to as “Round Zero” of the Mexican Ministry of Energy assigning exploration and
production rights, “PEMEX was awarded rights to 95.9% of the proved reserves that it had
requested.”164 Percentages of PEMEX’s market dominance likely vary across the varied
phases of the oil and gas industry phases, but this example of Round Zero assignments
illustrates PEMEX’s continued role as a predominant actor in the industry. Importantly, in
any block that contains transboundary resources, PEMEX is required to have 20%
involvement.165
c) State Agencies
Several governmental bodies regulate the Mexican oil and gas industry. The
discussion below focuses on the responsibilities of those agencies that are exclusive to the
oil and gas industry.
The Mexican Ministry of Energy (“SENER”) is responsible generally for Mexico’s
national energy policy.166 Following the Energy Reform, SENER’s planning faculties and
stewardship strengthened.167 SENER can be thought of as the first necessary authority for
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oil and gas production: SENER determines geographical areas available to be awarded for
exploration and extraction, determines the type of contract to be awarded per geographical
area, and issues pertinent permits.168 Contract types SENER may award include those for
services, profit sharing, production sharing, licenses, or any combination thereof.169
Even more exclusive to the oil and gas industry is the National Hydrocarbon
Commission (“CNH”).170 The mission of CNH is to “efficiently and reliably regulate
exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons in Mexico to promote investment and economic
growth.”171 Although the CNH pre-dates the Energy Reform, the newly monopoly-free
business opportunities in Mexico’s oil and gas sector post reform made CNH’s role even
more crucial; CNH was strengthened post-Energy Reform “with its own legal personality,
technical and managerial autonomy, and budgetary self-sufficiency.”172 CNH has six
primary responsibilities:
● [t]o organize the bidding procedures for the awarding of exploration and
extraction contracts;
● [to] sign and manage exploration and extraction contracts with
companies successful in the bidding procedures;
● [to] review technical information related to hydrocarbons onshore and
offshore fields;
● [to] approve authorizations filed by the state-owned oil company
PEMEX to farm out allocations awarded to PEMEX in Round Zero of
the auctions;
● [to] provide technical support to . . . [SENER] in matters related to
hydrocarbons; and
● [to] approve exploration and extraction plans.173
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The Energy Regulatory Commission (“CRE”) has administrative authority over the
energy sector.174 The CRE is responsible for regulating and issuing “permits related to
transport, storage, distribution, compression, liquefaction, decompression, regasification,
commercialization and public selling.”175 Specifically on gas, CRE is responsible for
determining “the geographical zones for the distribution of natural gas through
pipelines.”176
Sectored to SENER and operating alongside CRE in monitoring gas pipelines is the
National Center for Control of Natural Gas (“CENAGAS”), which is a decentralized body
with a mission “to guarantee the management, transportation and storage necessary for the
safe, reliable and efficient supply of natural gas in the country.”177 CENAGAS took
ownership and management authority over gas pipelines from PEMEX after the Energy
Reform.178
Another ministry of importance, but not exclusive to the oil and gas industry, is the
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (“SHCP”).179 In 2014, the SHCP established the
Mexican Petroleum Fund, “which is responsible for managing the revenues obtained from
contracts and assignments for oil exploration and extraction activities.”180
Health, safety, and environmental standards are regulated primarily by the
Environmental and Natural Resources Ministry, which acts through the National Agency
of Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection of the Hydrocarbons Sector. These
agencies are discussed in more detail in Section IV(A)(3) below.
2. Licensing
The Energy Reform also significantly changed the licensing structure for the
Mexican hydrocarbons industry. To effectuate the reform, the Mexican government
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enacted new regulations and rules for the main aspects of the hydrocarbon industry
including planning, exploration and production, transport and storage, use of associated
natural gas, infrastructure, and measurement.181 Though the reform provides for different
tools and processes for effectuating exploration and production, including licenses, joint
operating agreement, and direct assignments to PEMEX, the Nieto administration appeared
to prefer licenses for offshore blocks due to the flexibility and protection they provide
Mexico based on the risk associated with offshore drilling.
The licensing structure created following the Energy Reform differed significantly
from the prior regime, as licenses were not required due to the PEMEX monopoly. CNH
issued rules and procedures for the new bidding process, by which international oil
companies could bid on and procure the rights to develop hydrocarbon resources in
Mexico. Though many methods were available, the Nieto Administration decided that a
licensing structure would best meet their goals.
The licensing structure enacted following the Energy Reform, allows private
companies to secure a permit exploration and production of hydrocarbons in Mexico. As
discussed above, the Nieto administration made Constitutional amendments and enacted
22 pieces of secondary legislations or transitory articles, thereby predominantly placing the
Energy Reform in legislative “fine print” as opposed to fighting the battle to effectuate
reform via constitutional amendments.182 The licenses CNH awarded are for an initial term
of 35 years with the potential for a five year extension, and a 10 year extension.183 During
a bidding round, an interested company (or consortium) will submit a bid for the specific
block for which they wish to obtain a license. This bid will include changed variables that
will be entered into a formula to determine the highest bidder. These variables or factors
include additional royalties owed to the government, an additional investment factor to be
added to the minimum work requirements (units), and a bonus to break ties. Ultimately and
rather simply, the highest bid wins the block.184
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The actual bidding process is very transparent, leading to greater trust and
confidence in the process.185 First, the entire process, from the company’s presentation of
the sealed bid envelopes to the words written on the bids, is filmed. Every company
participating in the round approaches the front table with the boxes containing their sealed
bids for the blocks in full view of all in attendance. The CNH official goes block by block,
opening each envelope on camera. If there is a bid, it is placed on an easel and shown on
camera so that every single person in attendance and every person viewing the video can
read the bid for themselves. Variables are then entered into a spreadsheet, again on camera,
and calculations are made. The winning bid is then clearly shown during the bidding round.
This process is incredibly transparent, and makes it clear to the world that Mexico intends
the process to be as fair and uncorrupt as possible.
As many as 70 companies—including national oil companies and major
international independents like Shell, Chevron, Total, and BP—have participated in
bidding rounds, resulting in at least $180 billion of investments in the Mexican
hydrocarbon industry.186 Shell procured one of the most notable fields, “the Whale.” Based
on seismic information obtained six months prior to the bidding round via involvement in
a U.S. field located at the maritime boundary with Mexico, Shell determined that “the
Whale” would be profitable if produced on both the U.S. and Mexico sides of the border.187
Shell estimates that the formation could be capable of producing 900,000 barrels of oil
equivalent (“BOE”) per day by 2020, or 700 million barrels in its productive lifespan.188
However Shell did not disclose this information until after the bidding round commenced.
Andy Brown, Upstream Director at Shell, noted that “Post the Whale discovery we had
some geological insights. It is not by accident we didn’t announce it until the day of the
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bid. The nine blocks give us significant potential.”189 Shell made the winning bid on 9 of
the 19 blocks, all close to the U.S. maritime border.190 Shell’s cash payment for the blocks
totaled $343 million, which is roughly 65% of total payouts from that round of $625
million.191 Because of the proximity to the border, this find might initiate the transboundary
framework agreement discussed in Section IV(C).
3. Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulations
The primary agency responsible for overseeing health, safety, and environmental
regulations in Mexico is the Environmental and Natural Resources Ministry
(“SEMARNAT”). SEMARNAT is broadly “responsible for the protection, restoration and
conservation of [Mexico’s] ecosystems and natural resources, as well as pollution control,
climate change prevention, and water resource management.”192 With the goal of
environmental conservation harmonized with natural resource development, SEMARNAT
supervises all hydrocarbon activities, including pipeline construction, emissions
monitoring, and hazardous waste disposal.193
SEMARNAT fulfills its responsibilities through the newly created National
Agency of Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection of the Hydrocarbons Sector
(“ASEA”).194 Creation of ASEA resulted from the 2013 Energy Reform and ASEA’s
overarching goal is to ensure that the “industry operate[s] with safe and environmentally
responsible standards.”195 It is responsible for monitoring ongoing hydrocarbon activities
as well as any accidents or emergencies, and is tasked with “issuing technical regulations,
restrictive rules, and performance-based regulations.”196 ASEA has one of the broadest
mandates compared with its counterparts in other countries, and its jurisdiction is vast. It
supervises and implements the safety and environmental standards of “all hydrocarbonrelated activities in Mexico: from the deep-water fields in the Gulf all the way to the gas
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pumped in retail stations.”197 The development, implementation, and enforcement of those
standards requires adequate resources and staffing at every level of production, which
could prove challenging due to its limited resources.198
ASEA inherited responsibilities previously allocated to PEMEX and is reforming
its health, safety, and environmental standards by creating “a regulation and supervision
model . . . designed so that all operators can achieve effective risk management for their
activities.”199 ASEA’s model depends on six elements:
1.
Safety and Environmental Management Systems (“SEMS”) – All
operators in Mexico must function under SEMS. ASEA (of Mexico)
collaborated with the BSEE (of the United States) in developing its SEMS
to ensure the programmes of both countries are compatible and aimed
“holistically at the company and their safety performance.”200
2.
Sufficient Financial Responsibility – ASEA ensures adequate
liability insurance coverage in the event of an accident. Operating under the
mandate of insurance is mandatory.201
3.
Regulations – ASEA implements technical regulations, prescriptive
regulations, and performance-based regulations, and is focusing most on
performance-based regulations.202
4.
Corrective Enforcement – ASEA favors correction of noncompliance prior to enforcing fines.203
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5.
Risk-Based Inspections – ASEA leads inspections based on SEMS
reports and SEMS audits.204
6.
Insurance Company and Third-Party Inspections – ASEA authorizes
and approves independent third parties to assist in safety and inspections.205
Regarding oil spill prevention and response, ASEA complies with Mexico’s
National Offshore Energy Response Protocol (known as “Plan Nacional de Emergencias,”
which the Mexican Navy oversees), which acts as a regional contingency plan, by
monitoring and supervising protocol execution and by defining technical elements for
emergency preparedness and response projects.206 The 1979 Ixtoc oil spill in Mexico
created a transboundary issue when it spread to Texas beaches, and as a result, the two
countries created the Joint Contingency Plan between the Secretariat of the Navy of the
United Mexican States and the United States Coast Guard Regarding Pollution of the
Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances
(“MEXUS Plan”).207 The MEXUS Plan is implemented when a spill in one country
“impacts or threatens the other country,” and its purpose is to “promote a coordinated
system for regional preparedness, planning, and response to incidents in adjacent waters
by providing guidance that supplements the existing national response system of each
country and facilitates joint response at the regional level.”208 Although the MEXUS Plan
is legally non-binding, it is “[s]till the overarching guiding document for marine
environmental pollution cooperation,” and requires obligations under national and
international laws.209 The plan is reviewed every five years and was significantly modified
in the most recent review.210 Under the previous framework, the two nations could
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“physically move into each other’s water in responding to spills,” but the changes now
mandate that each country is responsible for oil spill clean-ups on its side of the boundary,
although it still mandates that they “coordinate, cooperate, and communicate.”211 This shift
illustrates a “gap in collaborative management” and could potentially set back progress
made by the two countries.212 The MEXUS Plan is problematic in other ways—it is
retroactive in that “it only contemplates coordination once a disaster has occurred” and it
fails to include important actors like ASEA and CNH, which have no authority.213
4. Unitization on Blocks in Mexican Waters
Until recently the framework in Mexico did not truly have a necessity for
unitization agreements or JOAs because of the PEMEX monopoly, thus it simply applied
the rule of capture to reservoirs that crossed unit boundaries.214 This incentivized the
extraction of resources as quickly as possible and led to inefficiencies. There was no rule
making unitization in Mexico possible, and unitization was likely unconstitutional. Per the
Energy Reform, operators are now obligated to inform SENER “when they have evidence
of a shared reservoir within Mexican territory.”215 The adjacent operators must present a
preliminary unitization agreement that outlines the joint exploration and production they
would undertake. The operators may work under the preliminary agreement for up to twoyears.216
CNH would assist SENER, who has the responsibility to approve or reject the
agreement, with reviewing this preliminary agreement.217 SENER is also empowered to
act as an arbiter for disputes. If the operators are unable to come to an agreement on the
final unitization agreement, SENER would establish the terms based on “principles of
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economics, competition, efficiency, legality, transparency, industry best practices and best
use of the hydrocarbon,” per the language of the rules.218
The final unitization agreement should include dispute resolution, create the
scheme for joint operation and management of the reservoir, and specify the procedures
and triggers for redetermination of field apportionment.219 Once agreed upon by the
operators and approved by SENER, the unitization agreement becomes a binding contract
for the parties involved in the unit.220 This reform to the rules creates a regulatory system
that emphasizes safe, efficient extraction of the hydrocarbons instead of quick, wasteful
extraction based on the rule of capture. If implemented correctly, Mexico should be able
to maximize revenue from the resources and create safer drilling conditions.
5. Conflict Resolution
In general, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as conciliation,
mediation, and arbitration are widely practiced in the Mexican legal system.221 The
Commercial Code allows for the recognition and enforceability of conciliation
agreements.222 Over the past decade, Mexican courts have encouraged mediation.223
As a result of PEMEX’s decades long monopoly,224 there is little history of contract
disputes in the Mexican oil and gas sector. Following expropriation of foreign investments
in the oil and gas sector in 1938, Mexico continued to engage in some service contracts
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with U.S. companies.225 In 1958, this practice was outlawed,226 making “Mexico’s energy
industry among the most tightly controlled in the world.”227
The Hydrocarbons Act, which implements the Energy Reform, provides the
framework for conflict resolution. Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Act authorizes the use
of ADR methods in exploration and extraction contracts.228 In addition, Article 21 also
establishes two noteworthy, mandatory provisions.229 First, in regards to arbitration,
Mexican federal law must be the choice of law, meaning Mexican law will govern the
substance of the dispute.230 Second, arbitration must be conducted in Spanish.231 Finally,
the model contracts promulgated by CNH provide a procedure for optional conciliation.232
One notable exception to the availability of ADR mechanisms relates to
“administrative rescission.”233 This occurs when the government chooses to end the
contracts in place. The Hydrocarbons Act explicitly allows the Mexican government to
take this action.234 Several important considerations relate to this provision.
First, Mexico previously exercised its administrative rescission authority in
connection with monopolization.235 As Mexico reopens its oil and gas sector, interested
foreign entities will likely be concerned with history repeating itself.236 In a move that may
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serve to allay some of those fears, Article 20 limits unilateral rescission to specifically
enumerated circumstances.237 In addition, the model contracts promulgated by CNH
include “a procedural framework that may provide reassurance to investors that the
Commission will not invoke the rescission clause imprudently.”238
Second, the Hydrocarbons Act exempts disputes related to administrative rescission
from the ADR process. “Article 23.3 mandates that all disputes regarding administrative
rescission shall be resolved exclusively by the federal courts of Mexico.”239 This exemption
creates significant concerns for contractors and investors,240 primarily the reality that
parallel proceedings may result from Mexico invoking its rescission authority.241 For
instance, a foreign investor may challenge rescission in the Mexican courts while
simultaneously pursuing separate claims through arbitration.
B. U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Sector
1. Actors and Agencies and their Interactions
a) Authority
Pursuant to International Law, specifically customary principles furthered by
UNCLOS, the United States has the authority to govern, and retains sovereign rights to,
the seabed and the soil extending roughly 200 miles from the furthest point from the
continent.242 Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, due to its global
sweeping effects, many of the provisions have become de facto law in the sense that the
customary principals now serve as a guiding force for the United States.243 The federal law
that regulates the exploitation of oil and gas resources of the coast is the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”).244 The importance of the act is twofold. Firstly, it gives the
primary regulation of these activities to the federal government and the duly appointed
agencies.245 Secondly, it provides mechanisms, particularly in regard to the leasing
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program discussed in Section IV(B)(4) below, to ensure the minerals are being exploited
in an efficacious manner.246
One area of particular note that is not regulated by the federal government, is the
first nine nautical miles off the coast of Texas.247 This area is regulated by the State of
Texas in accordance with the Submerged Federal Lands Act of 1953, and was upheld to be
constitutional by the Supreme Court.248 This act, thus, affords Texas the ability to regulate
and develop the natural minerals within those waters.249 This presents an immense obstacle
in regards to transboundary disputes with the Mexican State. Since Texas is the entity with
the rights to these waters, they should, in theory, be the ones conducting agreements with
Mexico. A problem arises, however, because this act would be seen as a treaty and would
infringe on the President’s power to conduct treaties with foreign nations pursuant to the
Constitution.250 If a transboundary reserve is found within this specific tract, it is uncertain
how an agreement will be reached.251
b) Agencies
Currently three agencies, pursuant to OCSLA and the ensuing amendments to the
act, exist to regulate the activities in the Gulf of Mexico—the Bureau of Ocean
Management (“BOEM”), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”),
and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (“ONRR”).252
BOEM is the primary agency responsible for regulating U.S. offshore oil and gas
activities. The purpose of BOEM is to ensure that natural resources are exploited in an
environmentally safe and economically efficient manner.253 The agency is responsible for
overseeing the leasing plots in the Gulf, as well as the implementation of those plans.254
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BOEM is also responsible for the evaluation of resources and compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).255 While BOEM supervises some environmental
issues, most of those issues are the responsibility of BSEE.256 The Primary role of BSEE
is to initiate safety measures and enforce their utilization on the offshore platforms.257
Finally, ONRR manages the budget and payment for use of land exploited by private
entities.258 The payments made to ONRR, once collected, are then distributed to the U.S.
Treasury.259
c) Current Issues
Currently, two main issues could have profound effects on U.S. ability to exploit
transboundary reserves in cooperation with Mexico, and in accordance with the 2012
Agreement and International Law. The first deals with the power OCSLA gives to the
executive branch. Article 12(a) of the act allows the executive to issue moratoria for
offshore drilling in specific areas.260 Numerous presidents have utilized the moratoria
section. Most recently, President Donald Trump rescinded moratoria on areas President
Barack Obama previously established.261 The concern is that rescinded moratoria could
produce numerous safety, economic, and environmental concerns in the Gulf of Mexico as
offshore platforms must conform to new regulations in a specified time period.262 More
generally, however, it proves to be an issue that one person has the authority and autonomy
to radically alter the offshore regulation regime in the Gulf of Mexico in one fell swoop.
The second concern relates to the dispute resolution provisions of the 2012
Agreement and whether the U.S. would recognize its authority, as discussed further in
Section IV(C)(4).
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2. Licensing

OCSLA grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to issue leases for
hydrocarbon exploration and production.263 There are four basic lease stages, each
requiring different forms and disclosures: (1) preparation of the leasing program; (2) lease
sales; (3) exploration; and (4) development and production. A licensee must apply and be
granted a lease at each stage. At least thirty days before a lease sale, the Secretary shall
submit to Congress and publish a notice in the Federal Register identifying the bidding
process to be utilized, and the lease tracts designated to be offered for sale.264 “The
Secretary is authorized to grant to the highest responsible qualified bidder or bidders by
competitive bidding, . . . any oil and gas lease on submerged lands of the outer Continental
Shelf which are not covered by leases meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of section
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1335 of this title.”265 “Leasing activities shall be conducted to assure receipt of fair market
value for the lands leased and the rights conveyed by the Federal Government.”266 The
following diagram, provided by BOEM, succinctly lays out the process by which blocks
are licensed.267
BOEM sets minimum bid levels, rental, and royalty rates on an individual block to
be leased, based on its assessment of market and resource conditions as the sale
approaches.268 BOEM uses a two-phase, post-sale bid evaluation process to meet the fair
market value requirement under OCSLA. “Under its bid adequacy procedures, BOEM
reviews the highest bid for each block using either tract-specific bidding factors or detailed
tract-specific analytical factors to ensure that fair market value is received for each lease
issued.”269
The bidding process is done by sealed bid and the potential lessees can vary
different factors to make their bid competitive: a fixed cash bonus; variable royalty based
on the value of production saved, removed, or sold; a fixed work commitment based on
dollar amount for exploration; a sliding royalty to encourage continued production; or any
combination thereof.270 After a hydrocarbon lease is issued, the lessee shall deliver to the
Secretary either a cash deposit for the full amount of the exploration work commitment, or
a performance bond assuring that lessee shall faithfully discharge their work duties and
commitments.271 The Secretary must ensure that activities are carried out in a manner that
provides for: safety, environmental protection, prevention of waste, conservation of natural
resources, and coordination with federal agencies; protection of national security interests;
protection of rights on the outer continental shelf; a fair return to the United States for any
lease; prevention of interference of use in the EEZ; consideration of the location and other
uses, such as fishery or a deep-water port; public notice and comment; and governmental
oversight of the lease area and facilities.272
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Each leased tract shall not exceed 5,760 acres, unless necessary to develop a single
economic production unit, and shall be for an initial period of five years or not to exceed
ten years.273 The lease entitled the lessee to explore, develop, and produce hydrocarbons
pursuant to an approved development and production plan.274 The lease also has the
requirements to pay royalties, rental, and a requirement to offer 20% of the crude oil,
condensate, and natural gas liquids produced to small or independent refiners.275 Prior to
production, every lessee must submit an exploration plan to the Secretary which includes
schedules for exploration activities, a description of the equipment to be used, and a general
location of each well to be drilled.276
3. Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulations
a) Overview of Regulations
Offshore oil and gas drilling is subject to a wide range of health, safety, and
environmental regulations. Some regulations are broad and pertain to all relevant federal
activity, while others specifically target offshore operators.
Pursuant to OCSLA, offshore oil and gas activities are subject to the federal leasing
system described in Section IV(B)(2) above.277 Congress has control over outer continental
shelf (“OCS”) resources beyond three miles, while states retain ownership and control
within the three-mile distance of their coast.278 OCSLA requires the Interior Secretary to
prepare an oil and gas leasing program for the OCS. Offshore leasing occurs according to
four statutorily prescribed steps: (1) preparation of the leasing program; (2) lease sales; (3)
exploration; and (4) development and production. The actions in these steps are all subject
to a separate statutory mandate—NEPA.279 NEPA was enacted in 1970 with the broad goal
of “preserving the environment for future generations.”280 NEPA is an informationgenerating law in that it “requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact
statements for all proposed ‘major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
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human environment’ in order to ensure that decisions are based on full consideration of
their environmental consequences.”281 In addition to standards imposed by OCSLA
triggering NEPA, the Coastal Zone Management Act requires that Interior Department
activities “directly affecting the coastal zone” must be conducted “in a manner . . .
consistent with approved state management programs,” which could force the company to
comply with relevant state health, safety, and environmental laws where applicable.282
Approximately twenty other environmental laws were enacted in the 1970s that
either directly or peripherally impact the offshore drilling industry, notably including the
following:
● The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act “requires
agencies to analyze the potentially adverse impacts of oil and gas activities on fish
habitat and populations, and provide conservation measures to mitigate those
impacts.”283
● The Endangered Species Act “requires federal agencies to determine the potential
adverse impact of oil and gas activities on endangered and threatened species, limits
activities that harm individual members of such species, and bars altogether
activities that place such species in jeopardy.”284
● The Marine Mammal Protection Act “imposes limits on activities that injure or . . .
harass marine mammals.”285
● The National Marine Sanctuaries Act “requires consultations to guard against harm
to marine sanctuary resources from oil and gas leasing activities.”286
● The Clean Water Act “imposes permitting requirements on any discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters from such activities.”287
● The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which a Presidential Executive Order later
supplemented, imposes “oil-spill planning, preparedness, and response
requirements on fixed and floating facilities engaged in oil and gas exploration,
281
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development, and production on the outer continental shelf.”288 The Act also
imposes financial liability on companies responsible for spills, requiring them to
compensate “those who suffered as a result of the spill—through property damage,
lost profits, and other economic injuries—and for restoring injured natural
resources.”289 However, liability is capped at $75 million, “unless it can be shown
that the responsible party was guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct,
violated a federal safety regulation, or failed to report the incident or cooperate with
removal activities, in which case there is no limit on damages.”290
In addition, OCSLA itself includes environmental provisions to deal with the
unique environmental hazards of offshore oil and gas development, including oil spills,
discharges of metal cuttings, and air emissions of conventional and toxic pollutants.291
Further, Congress and the Interior Department have the ability to impose moratoria on
leasing in environmentally sensitive areas.292 If an offshore lease has been issued, the
company must comply with and complete certain procedures under OCSLA. For instance,
the company must obtain a Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System permit from the Environmental Protection Agency for any pollutant discharges into
ocean waters.293 If exploration is successful, the company must also obtain the Interior
Department’s approval for a development and production plan, which describes the
proposed drilling and related environmental safeguards.294 However, importantly, OCSLA
“expressly singles out the Gulf of Mexico for less rigorous environmental oversight under
NEPA.”295 It exempted lessees from having to submit the required development and
production plans, effectively removing “at least one NEPA environmental impact
statement” for leases in the Gulf of Mexico.296 As analyzed below, this exemption removed
important environmental safeguards and had lasting detrimental effects.
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b) Deepwater Horizon Spill
On April 20, 2010, BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil platform exploded, resulting in
eleven deaths and causing nearly five million barrels of oil to be released over 86 days,
making it the largest offshore oil spill in world history.297
The underlying causes leading to the disaster have been extensively researched and
analyzed, and can be broadly summarized as the result of a fundamentally inadequate
safety culture of the U.S. offshore oil and gas industry where it was “acceptable to increase
the risk of a spill in order to reduce costs.”298 Despite all of the above-mentioned statutory
mandates in place to ensure environmental and safety protections were implemented, none
of them proved effective in preventing the disaster. Most importantly, the Minerals
Management Service (“MMS”) (the agency previously tasked with regulation and
compliance with NEPA) “engaged in no NEPA review of the well’s permitting” and
“neither MMS nor other federal agencies gave significant attention to the environmental
mandates of other federal laws.”299 The shocking result is that there was no “site-specific
review of the drilling operations of the Macondo well,” despite layers of “required
environmental scrutiny—by NEPA, the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, and the Oil Pollution Act—and the potential application of some of the
nation’s toughest environmental restrictions—the Endangered Species Act and Clean
Water Act.”300
The Deepwater Horizon disaster spurred numerous changes in the U.S. health,
safety, and environmental regime, the most structural of which was the dissolution of the
MMS into three separate agencies. Prior to Deepwater Horizon, MMS was the sole federal
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agency responsible for overseeing the offshore oil and gas industry.301 The disaster made
it apparent that MMS “fell short in its ability to oversee the offshore oil industry.”302 Less
than one month after Deepwater Horizon, Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar dissolved MMS
and created BOEM and BSEE, with the goal of removing seemingly conflicting interests
by stripping “MMS’s safety and environmental enforcement responsibilities away from its
leasing, revenue collection, and permitting functions, and to place the former within a
‘separate and independent’ entity.”303
These pervasive inadequacies apparent across the sector could not be solved by a
reorganization of regulating entities alone, although the creation of two agencies tasked
with health, safety, and environmental oversight was certainly a step in the right direction.
Several other steps were taken by both regulating entities and by the industry itself to
remedy the systematic inadequacies. President Obama signed an Executive Order
establishing a National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Coasts, and Great
Lakes.304 The Executive Order included a set of guiding principles for management
decisions and actions toward ocean and coastal stewardship and created a National Ocean
Council with the power to direct executive agencies to implement its recommendations.305
The Council released its final Implementation Plan in April 2013, presenting “specific
actions Federal agencies will take to bolster [] ocean economy, improve ocean health,
support local communities, strengthen our security, and provide better science and
information to improve decision-making.”306 Another Executive Order issued by President
Obama established the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling, which was tasked with “providing recommendations on how the United
States can prevent and mitigate the impact of any future spills that result from offshore
drilling.”307 It released its final Report to the President in January 2011 which included
recommendations for new regulations.308 In addition, major drilling firms announced plans
to invest an initial $1 billion to create the Marine Well Containment Company, a
consortium to design, build, and operate a system capable of containing future deep-water
301

LAITOS, ET AL., supra note 284, at 824.

302

DEEPWATER HORIZON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 288, at 84.

303

Id. at 71.

304

LAITOS, ET AL., supra note 284, at 844.

305

Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SEC’Y (July 19, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/documents/2010stewardship-eo.pdf.
306

Id.

307

DEEPWATER HORIZON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 288.

308

Id.

47

spills in the Gulf of Mexico. Regulators also updated permit requirements to include a
demonstration of ability to contain spills. Both of these moves, while commendable efforts,
were heavily criticized as being reactionary and having a retrospective focus.
In response to Deepwater Horizon, BSEE issued the original “Workplace Safety
Rule” “as a way to improve safety of offshore operations.”309 This rule implemented
SEMS, which were subsequently revised in 2013.310 BSEE also released a “Safety Culture
Policy Statement,” which included BSEE’s definition of safety culture as “the core values
and behaviors of all members of an organization that reflect a commitment to conduct
business in a manner that protects people and the environment,” and it identified nine
elements of a strong safety culture.311 The Policy Statement also conceded that
“[p]rescriptive regulations can reduce risks to worker safety and the environment, but they
alone are not enough.”312 Lastly, the offshore oil and gas industry created the “Center for
Offshore Safety (COS), an industry-sponsored organization funded through API,” to focus
exclusively on offshore safety.313 The purpose of COS is to “to serve the U.S. offshore oil
and gas industry with the purpose of adopting standards of excellence to ensure continuous
improvement in safety and offshore operational integrity.”314
The Trump administration has actively engaged in deregulation measures that have
rolled back some of the measures put in place in the wake of Deepwater Horizon “on the
grounds that they are overly burdensome on industry.”315 Notably, the Administration
revised two BSEE regulations—one concerning the “production-safety-systems rule,
which addresses devices used during offshore oil production,” and another concerning the
“well-control rule, which aims to prevent the kind of blowout” that caused the Deepwater
Horizon disaster.316 The deregulation has been controversial, with conservationists arguing
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that the rollbacks will only save the industry money at the costs of human lives and
environmental degradation. For example, “several of the independent companies seeking
the rollback . . . had been cited for workplace safety violations in recent years at a rate
much higher than the industry average. Their offshore platforms suffer in some cases from
years of poor maintenance, as well as equipment failures or metal fatigue on aging devices,
records show.”317 On the other side other spectrum are those who blame the Obama
administration for having “an overbearing regulatory reaction to the Deepwater Horizon
accident,” contributing to the oil and gas downturn.318 According to some, the Obama-era
regulations “were not necessarily increasing safety, but they were just increasing the cost
of the activities in the oil and gas industry and thus hindering their ability to keep operating
in the Gulf.”319 BSEE Director Scott Angelle is in support of the Trump administration’s
measures, and acknowledged the need for safety regulations but said, “we don’t need to
overregulate in a way that disincentivizes investment.”320 According to Angelle, “it is not
an either/or proposition . . . We can actually increase domestic energy production and
increase safety and environmental protection.”321
4. Unitization and Joint Operations in U.S. Waters
The United States has a long and robust legal history of unitization. Because the
offshore development process is so expensive, lessees will enter into a unitization
agreement early on to maximize their ability to profit off the unit and approach the
development in a rational and efficient manner.322 The prospect of building two drilling
rigs, two sets of pipelines, and duplicative infrastructure can be irrational or not feasible
depending on the field.323 The unit operator becomes free to drill in the location that makes
the most sense based on the geology of the formation and in terms of engineering.324 The
agreements protect each lessee’s royalty interest by entitling each to a percentage of the
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operation. This encourages cooperation and agreement to maximize the efficiency of the
field.325
BSEE approves, and can even require, unitization for the purposes of natural
resource conservation in the Outer Continental Shelf, protection of licensee rights, and/or
prevention of waste.326 An additional benefit of unitization is that it also promotes faster
exploration and development of the resources.327 Through unitization BSEE combines or
consolidates leases or potions of leases as outlined by a Unit Agreement.328
BSEE’s model agreement outlines that a single entity will be designated as the unit
operator with all the rights and obligations. The unit operator shall enter into a unit
operating agreement which shall describe how all costs and liabilities incurred in
maintaining or conducting operations pursuant to this Agreement shall be apportioned and
assumed. The unit operating agreement shall also describe how the benefits which may
accrue from operations conducted on the unit area shall be apportioned.329
Joint operating agreements are also common practice in the United States to allow
a group of oil companies to come together in a single license for one block and share the
cost, risk, and reward.330 These agreements also allow the companies to elect one operator
that will be in charge of the day to day operations of the block. In the Gulf of Mexico JOAs
are often form contracts.331 On the American side of the Gulf, the American Association
of Petroleum Landmen form contract is the most commonly used.332 On occasion, if one
of the companies that is a party to the agreement is a foreign company, the parties will use
a form contract produced by the Association for International Petroleum Negotiators.333
5. Conflict Resolution
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Regardless of the dispute resolution mechanism employed in a conflict, the “[v]alue
of complete, precisely drafted agreements can’t be overstated.”334 In the United States,
parties to oil and gas contracts rely heavily on forms.335 One outcome is that the agreement
may be less than clear because the parties have not tailored the contract to their specific
circumstances.336 Not surprisingly, the interpretation of agreements and the meaning of
contract language is a significant driver of disputes.337 Another outcome is that there are
many contracts containing essentially the same language. This creates a situation where
precedent may have an unusually strong role in litigation.338
Most domestic disputes in oil and gas involve surface activities rather than offshore
activities.339 In the surface context, lawsuits on royalty disputes represent roughly half of
all litigation.340 Royalty disputes typically involve a disagreement about how and where
production is valued, and typically involve claims of under- or over-payment of
royalties.341
Arbitration is also widely in use for both domestic and international disputes.342
The Supreme Court has recognized “the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution.”343 The Court also stated that this “federal policy applies with special force in
the field of international commerce.”344 Arbitration is frequently preferred by the parties in
an international agreement because of uncertainty surrounding litigation in a foreign
jurisdiction.345
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Common international disputes involve production sharing contracts, stabilization
clauses, and pre-emptive rights.346 With production sharing contracts, disputes commonly
arise from the tension between the government entity and the contractor over how and in
what volume the exploration and production costs are recouped.347 Stabilization clauses
are intended to protect investors from large fluctuations in fiscal terms.348 Conflicts arise
from the fact that the clause may create, or appear to create, a situation where the contractor
enjoys the upside while avoiding the downside of price fluctuations.349 Pre-emptive rights
offer protection for investors when other parties experience a change of control.350
The frequency of oil and gas disputes is, not surprisingly, strongly correlated with
the price of oil.351 When oil prices fall, increased pressure is applied to the contractors in
the industry, contracts may be cancelled, and there may be an increase in acquisitions and
bankruptcies.352 This in turn leads to conflicts related to interpretation of contract terms,
attempts at re-negotiation, non-payment, and contract termination rights.353 In terms of
conflicts between government entities and contractors, disputes frequently involve license
denial or revocation, regulatory changes, and expropriation.354
C. Transboundary Resources: U.S./ Mexico Treaty
In February 2012, prior to the Energy Reform discussed above, Mexico and the
United States signed the 2012 Agreement, a treaty concerning the joint management of
transboundary hydrocarbon structures and reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico (i.e., reservoirs
that straddle the maritime boundary between the two nations).355 The 2012 Agreement is
limited to the transboundary resources that are entirely located past nine nautical miles
from the shoreline to avoid complications with resources owned and regulated by Texas.356
346

Fiske, supra note 341.

347

Id.

348

Id.

349

Id.

350

Id.

351

Disputes in the Oil and Gas Sector, CORP. DISPUTES (Oct.-Dec. 2016),
https://www.corporatedisputesmagazine. com/disputes-in-the-oil-gas-sector.
352

Id.

353

Id.

354

Id.

355

García Sánchez & McLaughlin, supra note 257, at 746.

356

Id.

52

The two countries’ overall purpose in promulgating the Agreement was to establish a “legal
framework to achieve safe, efficient, equitable, and environmentally responsible
exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs that may exist along the maritime
boundaries,” to “promote equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary resources,
and . . . maximize the long term benefits from their exploitation.”357

Transboundary Field in the Gulf of Mexico.358

To these ends, the Agreement establishes a variety of regulations for licensing,
health, safety, and environmental concerns, sets out frameworks for transboundary
contractual agreements between the two countries and entities within them, and lays out
means for resolving disputes surrounding transboundary hydrocarbon reserves. The 2012
Agreement “opened more than 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that were previously
357
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off limits because of border issues.”359 Additionally, “BOEM has estimated that the
transboundary area could hold up to 172 MMbbl of oil and 8.6 Bcm (304 Bcf) of natural
gas,”360 evidencing the potential to develop underexploited oil fields and generate revenue
for both nations.
1. Actors and Agencies and their Interactions
The Agreement repeatedly delegates the rights and responsibilities of the parties to
their respective “executive agencies.”361 The Agreement defines “executive agencies” as
“the Agency of the Party designated to carry out the functions specified in this Agreement,
as each Party may designate from time to time.”362 These have so far been the executive
agencies explained in the foregoing sections: namely, on the Mexican side, SENER, CNH,
CRE, SHCP, SEMARNAT, and ASEA, and on the U.S. side, BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR.
Essentially, the executive agencies act as representatives of the countries
themselves, and are responsible for carrying out each country’s responsibilities to the other
pursuant to the Agreement. For example, pursuant to Article Five of the Agreement, each
country’s “Executive Agency shall . . . deliver quarterly reports to the other Executive
Agency on Exploration and Exploitation activities or operations carried out by Licensees
within [the reporting agency’s] jurisdiction in relation to the potential Transboundary
Reservoir.”363 Additionally, the Agreement imposes a minimum of 20% participation from
PEMEX in any transboundary field, even if the licensee was granted to another company
without any PEMEX involvement.364
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2. Licensee Regulations and Unitization
a) Licenses Granted Before the 2012 Agreement
One unique component of the 2012 Agreement is that it exempts from its
requirements any license that existed at the time the 2012 Agreement came into effect.365
The 2012 Agreement suggests that these licensees recognize and follow its terms, but does
not require it. The 2012 Agreement requires each government, through their respective
agencies, to consult on any activities within three statute miles of the boundary and provide
notice if the agency is aware of the existence of a transboundary reservoir, the agency
issues a license within 3 statute miles of the boundary, if a current licensee submits plans
to drill within 3 statute miles of the boundary, or a licensee submits development plans
within 3 statute miles of the boundary line.366 Within thirty days of the notice described
above, the agencies must initiate consultations to determine if a transboundary reservoir
exists.367
b) Unitization “Requirement”
The 2012 Agreement is designed to promote cooperation through unitization
agreements for reserves that extend beyond the countries’ maritime boundary.368 For the
first time, lessees on the U.S side of the boundary are able to cooperate with those on the
Mexican side. The 2012 Agreement hopes to take advantage of the cooperation of the two
sides. Chapter 2 addresses joint exploration and exploitation of transboundary reserves. A
careful reading makes it clear that the required method of cooperation among operators is
unitization, but it is also clear that licensees can also exploit reserves without entering into
a unitization agreement.369 If a unitization agreement is entered, the 2012 Agreement
requires the unitization to be approved by both states.370
The unitization agreement is required to contain the following check-listed items:
the identification of the unit area; the identity of the licensees and their respective
participating interests; the methodology used to calculate allocation for production; a
development plan with the estimated number and timeline for development; the effective
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date and term of the unitization agreement; the identity and appointment of the unit
operator371 including the processes for resignation, removal, and appointment of a
successor; provisions for transferring interest; royalty provisions; safety and environmental
measures to be taken under the laws of each state; provisions for information sharing
between the unit operator and the states; and procedures for redetermination, including
timelines and triggering events.372 The licensees must also enter into a separate Unit
Operating Agreement which will fail if ever in conflict with the unitization agreement.373
If the licensees cannot work together and determine the allocation of production to
be included in the unitization agreement within six months of the field being determined
transboundary, each party shall submit a proposed unitization agreement to each executive
agency to jointly estimate the amount of recoverable hydrocarbons in the field within thirty
days.374 If the agencies are unable to agree, the issue will then be sent to be resolved through
expert determination.375 If these problems continue, it will eventually be sent to a joint
commission.376 During this time, licensees may continue to unilaterally operate in the field,
but have to share with their cross-border licensee counterpart production numbers on a
monthly basis.377
c) Miscellaneous Provisions
The 2012 Agreement requires each licensee to pay the appropriate taxes and
royalties to their respective state. The differences in taxes, government participation,
royalty payments, contract labor price, and the availability of facilities in infrastructure
means that the profit margins for each licensee could differ drastically causing difficulties
during negotiations for the unitization agreement. One way that the 2012 Agreement tries
to alleviate issues is by requiring the licensees to use their best efforts within fifteen statute
miles on either side of the boundary to facilitate cooperation with facility use.378
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Article 23 provides for the termination of the 2012 Agreement and, importantly,
notes that “any unitization agreement, Unit Operating Agreement, or other agreement
entered into under this Agreement” shall continue.379 This sort of stabilization clause gives
the licensees some sense of legislative security against the possibility that the policies and
legislation of either state will change and leave their contracts useless.
3. Health, Safety, and Environmental Provisions
The preamble to the 2012 Agreement includes the overarching purpose of
establishing “a legal framework to achieve safe, efficient, equitable and environmentally
responsible exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs.”380 It further allows for
the countries to enter into “additional cooperative arrangements” which should also
“promote efficient, equitable, and environmentally responsible exploitation of
transboundary reservoirs.”381
Chapter Six contains the specific provisions related to the regulation of health,
safety, and environment within the U.S.-Mexico maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico.
Article 18 gives each Party “the right to inspect Facilities in a Unit Area,” subject to
applicable national law.382 The 2012 Agreement defines an “Inspector” to include
authorized people who carry out inspections related to construction and operation of
facilities, metering systems, and health, safety, and environmental protections of a
transboundary unit.383 The 2012 Agreement requires the Executive Agency of each Party
to develop procedures—again, subject to national law—regarding how the inspectors are
to consult with one another, share information, and gain physical access to Unit Areas.384
This joint inspection regime depends on the cooperation of inspectors on both sides in order
to successfully comply with “applicable safety and environmental standards,” although
guidance regarding which standards apply are not provided.385 The 2012 Agreement also
stipulates for emergency situations and allows one inspector to unilaterally “order the
immediate cessation of any or all operations upon the request of the other Inspector.”386
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This can be done when it is “necessary for the purpose of averting risk to life or serious
personal injury or significant damage to the environment” and only when “circumstances
do not permit the Inspectors to consult with the Executive Agencies.”387 The emergency
plan is problematic, however, because it uses terms such as “the Inspector with jurisdiction
over the activities giving rise to such risk” and “as authorized under national law,” without
defining what those terms mean or providing guidance that would allow the parties to
determine those terms in each case based on certain factors. The 2012 Agreement also
includes a plan to notify the Executive Agencies of the emergency cessations and gives the
Executive Agencies broad discretion to determine the “actions necessary to address the
risk.”388
Article 19 of the 2012 Agreement provides for safety and environmental
protections.389 It instructs the parties to adopt “common safety and environmental standards
and requirements” that are “compatible where necessary for the safe, effective, and
environmentally responsible implementation of this Agreement.”390 This broad mandate
fails to provide any specification in terms of the standards or the methods or requirements
of complying with the laws of either country. The 2012 Agreement carves out even more
certainty by stating that these standards should be developed “where appropriate” and
directs the Executive Agencies to “develop procedures” for their implementation.391
Finally, the 2012 Agreement acknowledges that both Parties have important international
obligations “with respect to oil pollution preparedness, response, and cooperation,” and
should therefore implement their safety and environmental standards such that it allows
them to fulfill these international obligations.392
The only other reference to health, safety, and environmental standards that will
govern transboundary reservoirs is located in Chapter 2 regarding unitization
agreements.393 Article 6 provides that each unitization agreement shall include “[s]afety
and environmental measures to be taken under the national laws of each Party.”394 This
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provision, similar to Article 18 and Article 19 in Chapter 6, is overly broad and ambiguous,
leaving all of the interpretation and discretion to the Parties.
These provisions, when read together, lack specificity regarding how to ensure
compliance with applicable laws and regulations in each country and leave glaring gaps
that foreseeable circumstances will certainly expose. The 2012 Agreement drafted
provisions intending to improve environmental and safety protections, yet “the plain
language makes no such guarantee.”395 The “common safety and environmental standards”
to be created in Article 19 could effectively mean the U.S. standards are lowered so that
companies can comply with the less strict—and thus less protective—of the two standards.
Similarly, under both Article 18 and Article 19, the parties are directed to develop common
standards addressing environmental protection, health, and safety, and allow an inspector
of either party to unilaterally order shutdowns in both jurisdictions.396 Does that mean that
health, safety, and environmental standards and enforcement under Mexican law will “have
to rise to U.S. levels,” or will U.S. standards be supplanted in transboundary areas in favor
of Mexican standards?397
Despite the uncertainty surrounding logistics with the implementation of these
health, safety, and environmental standards, the 2012 Agreement, taken as a whole,
promotes environmental goals by directing the parties to develop standards they will each
comply with, and by allowing unitization of transboundary reservoirs. Exploration and
exploitation through a single operator “promotes the rational, efficient production of a
resource, reduces waste and the drilling of unnecessary wells (and therefore reduces the
corresponding environmental risk).”398
4. Conflict Resolution
Chapter 5 of the 2012 Agreement lays out how the parties “should” settle disputes.
There are three main approaches to conflict resolution: the Joint Commission, arbitration,
and expert determination.399 Chapter 4, Article 14 establishes the Joint Commission as a
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permanent body, with the purpose of assisting the “Executive Agencies in administering
this agreement.”400 The Joint Commission is comprised of one representative from each
party and one alternate representative.401 This structure creates an even number (two) of
representatives on the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission is the first stop for both
parties when a conflict arises. If the Joint Commission cannot come up with a solution
within sixty days, each party has the option to bring the dispute to others forms of dispute
resolution outlined in Chapter 5.
It would be easy to imagine a situation where the Joint Commission is unable to
come to an agreement under the current framework. Each representative is paid by the party
they represent and is also commonly employed by a state executive agency. As there are
only the two parties, there is a good possibility that the representatives will come to an
impasse when interpreting the agreement. Even though the representatives have access to
experts and assistance they deem necessary,402 without a third party neutral an impasse is
more likely to occur, especially since both representatives are highly motivated to advocate
for the party they represent. Additionally, there is no motivation to drive the representatives
to come to a decision, instead if the representatives do not come to an agreement the parties
have the option to bring the dispute to other forms of resolution described in Chapter 5,
such as arbitration. However, the arbitration laid out in the 2012 Agreement is not
necessarily binding.403 Non-binding arbitration, a highly unusual provision, may be the
result of the parties’ discomfort with relinquishing political control over the area and its
resources.404 The tumultuous history between the United States and Mexico likely affects
both country’s ability to effectively compromise.405 If the states cannot come to an
agreement and the arbitration is not binding, there is nothing to deter them from continuing
the practice that caused the disagreement. Long-term, this is not sustainable and does not
support healthy relations and communication between states. While this may or may not
be the case, one thing is clear, the Joint Commission cannot function adequately under the
current framework.
Chapter 5 of the 2012 Agreement deals specifically with the settlement of disputes.
However, it does not start off with a strong call to conflict resolution that is binding.
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Instead, it instructs the parties to make “every effort to resolve any disagreement” through
“consultations as rapidly as possible”.406 This process encourages the parties to
communicate and have civil discourse in order to solve disputes however, it does not create
any binding finalization and decision process. If the parties do not come to an agreement,
section 2 suggests that either party has the ability to refer the disagreement to arbitration.407
However, the specifics of arbitration are not contained in the agreement itself and are,
instead, left up to the Joint Commission.408 Additionally, the parties are not forced to go to
arbitration, as the arbitration clause in Article 17 merely says “either Party may submit the
dispute to arbitration.”409 This non-obligatory “may” language, as opposed to a compelling
“shall,” make arbitration merely just an option for the parties.
Another important misstep regarding arbitration is the silence on a specific
arbitration process, including the selection of the arbitrators themselves and binding rules
and applicable laws. Section 7 of Article 14 explains that after the arbitration issues a final
recommendation, the Joint Commission has “30 days to consider the final recommendation
. . . [i]f the Joint Commission is unable to resolve any remaining differences within that
time, the dispute will be returned to the Parties.” 410 This allows the Joint Commission to
have oversight to determine if they accept the arbitration recommendation.411 Importantly,
the agreement classifies the final outcome of the arbitration as a recommendation,
indicating that it is has no binding power, whereas most arbitration agreements explicitly
state that an arbitration award is “final and binding” on the parties. Only if the Joint
Commission decides to accept this recommendation will it become binding. This is the
only binding mechanism for all types of disputes (expert determination only applies in
specific cases) that may arise under the 2012 Agreement, and yet it leaves much room for
instability and uncertainty in the dispute resolution process.
The Third main approach to dispute resolution is expert determination, which is
established by Article 16. The 2012 Agreement defines “Expert Determination” as “the
resolution of a dispute by an expert in accordance with Article 16,” which, in turn, provides
that in the event that an expert opinion is needed, each party shall appoint an “appointing
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expert,” who will then cooperatively appoint a single expert.412 The single expert then
reports to the Joint Commission after making his or her determination. Expert
determination is reserved for resolving issues pertaining to allocation of production and
redetermination.413 This section of the 2012 Agreement is the most specific regarding
dispute resolution, potentially due to the limited application of expert determination, but
particularly because allocation and redetermination of production affects the taxes,
royalties, and percentage of production taken by each of the respective parties. The higher
the percentage of production allocated to a party, the higher their costs, liabilities, and
importantly—profit potential.
The expert is to be appointed according to rules to be promulgated within 180 days
of the adoption of the 2012 Agreement; however, the process should have been laid out in
the 2012 Agreement itself, as these “guidance procedures” have still not been written.414
The default rules state that each party picks an appointing expert, who then decide among
themselves who will be the expert.415 The expert’s decision must be communicated to the
Joint Commission, but according to section 9 of Article 16, “[d]eterminations of the expert
shall be final and binding on the Parties.”416
The specific issue in question is in regards to the sections concerning the Joint
Commission and their ability to implement arbitration proceedings that currently do not
exist.417 If the commission does in fact agree upon proceedings, they may not be
recognizable in the United States.418 The U.S. Supreme Court, in a seminal case, decided
that decisions from international bodies not ratified by Congress had no authoritative effect
domestically.419 In other words, legislative action may be required before arbitral awards
approved by the Joint Commission would be binding in the United States.420 This issue
could have sweeping effects in relation to a transboundary dispute because a U.S. licensee
could argue that they are not bound by an award from arbitration under the 2012 Agreement
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because the award has no effect domestically.421 It is clear that the conflict resolution
portion of the 2012 Agreement lacks certainty. The procedures for resolving conflicts are
ambiguous, the mechanisms are non-binding, and follow through from the parties has not
occurred.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN UNITED STATES/MEXICO AND U.K./NORWAY
A. Cultural Context
The concept of culture plays an integral role in any international issue. A country
or an organization’s culture is woven into every aspect of the business and relationships.
In the oil and gas industry, culture is especially important in how each of the parties interact
with one another, structure agreements, and resolve conflict.
The oil and gas sector has many players acting simultaneously, each with their own
agenda. This factor only multiplies in the case of transboundary resources. Often, there are
two “licensees” which are both a consortium of two or three companies—likely including
a National Oil Company—bound under a JOA. These Licensees are then bound together
under a unitization agreement. Then, because it is transboundary, the two states along with
their plethora of executive agencies are thrown into the mix; each with their own rules,
regulations, forms, guidelines, and bureaucratic red tape. This alphabet soup of agencies,
states, operators, licensees, sub-contractors, and employees must all work together to safely
and efficiently produce the transboundary field. The distinct cultures of each group
involved makes this process extremely challenging.
Norway and the U.K. have a long history of cooperation with respect to
hydrocarbon projects in the North Sea, having signed six joint oil and gas agreements.422
Accordingly, the Framework Agreement and its implementation are regularly looked to as
a model for other countries. Countries with a less established history of bilateral
cooperation in this field must keep this longstanding history of cooperation in mind when
comparing methods and provisions for their own projects.423 One way to accommodate this
factor is to provide more clarity in how the provisions of a treaty will be enforced, and
enforce those provisions consistently.
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B. Key Distinctions
1. Transboundary Licensees and Unitization
Before discussing the transboundary agreements and their distinctions, it is
important to note some distinct differences in the basic licensing structure of the various
states. The most notable difference is Mexico's pure competitive bidding process. The U.K.
uses a structure where potential licensees are first approved to participate in the bidding
based on their abilities to perform the job. The companies are reviewed, and if they do not
pass this step, they are not allowed to participate in the bidding process. However, in
Mexico, the highest bidder wins, regardless of whether they are the best fit for the field or
if they have the technological expertise to efficiently produce the resource. However, to
give credit where credit is due, Mexico’s actual bidding process is as transparent as
possible, giving bidders confidence that the system is fair.
Another difference is the amount of royalties and government inclusion. In the
U.K., though the state receives royalties and has some government inclusion, they do not
operate through a national oil company. Norway, on the other hand, operates through its
national oil company, Equino (formerly Statoil). Because these two states have different
national structures within their hydrocarbons sector, the Framework Agreement provides a
good comparison to the United States and Mexico. The United States, like the U.K., has
no national oil company; and Mexico, like Norway, operates through their national oil
company, PEMEX.
The specific provisions in both the Framework Agreement and the 2012 Agreement
were previously discussed. However, although both agreements attempt to provide
guidance on the efficient exploitation of transboundary resources that straddle the maritime
boundary, one is more effective than the other. The Framework Agreement clearly details
what is expected of each licensee and each state and has been utilized by other states in
drafting their own transboundary agreements, including the 2012 Agreement and an
agreement that is currently being negotiated between Mauritania and Senegal.424
At first glance an important distinction is that in the 2012 Agreement, any license
given prior to the enactment of the 2012 Agreement is not bound by it and does not require
compensation for any damages to the other state. Though it is understandable that
prevention of retroactive application would be desirable, what makes it notable in the
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context of the Gulf of Mexico is that any possible transboundary fields are not already
under individual bilateral treaties managing their joint operation. This fact is relevant when
compared to the North Sea which had six such agreements in place prior to the Framework
Agreement.425 This means any current field which may be transboundary could still be
unilaterally exploited without regard to this new agreement or the international principle
of mutual restraint.
One of the most effective aspects of the Framework Agreement that is lacking in
the 2012 Agreement is the combination of the unitization agreement and the unit operating
agreement into one contract. The 2012 Agreement requires two separate contracts, which
could conflict with each other in relevant terms and procedures. By combining the two into
a UUOA, the Framework Agreement streamlines the process and leaves less room for
future contract disputes leading to less arbitration or litigation about the meaning of
conflicting contracts. Additionally, the Framework Agreement creates accountability in the
unitization process by clearly laying out the required steps that need to be taken and which
states laws apply to the agreement based on the location of the facilities. This sort of clarity
is missing from the 2012 Agreement.
The 2012 Agreement states that if the licensees cannot agree to the allocation of the
resources, they can continue to develop and drill as long as they “inform” the other about
their activities. This will lead to less effective and wasteful drilling practices and will cause
unnecessary additional costs regarding the exploitation of the field. Additionally, if the
licensees on either side of the border both rush to produce, they could cause damage to the
formation due to rapidly changing pressures. Finally, once the unit is eventually
apportioned, it is unclear what happens to the petroleum, or cash equivalents, already
produced. Is the side who produced too much according to their portion of the field required
to repay the other licensee? This unilateral exploitation goes against international customs
of mutual restraint and against engaging in activities that may cause damage to another
state’s sovereign rights or resources. Allowing either the United States or Mexico to
unilaterally exploit the transboundary resource if they cannot successfully negotiate a
unitization agreement also goes against the duty to negotiate in good faith. These difficult
issues develop when licensees are allowed to continue unilateral development without a
unitization agreement. It is a recipe for mutual destruction.
The current structure of the 2012 Agreement leaves little to incentivize the United
States to negotiate the unitization agreement fairly. From a purely economic position, U.S.
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producers are paying low royalties, roughly 7.5%, whereas many operators on the Mexico
side of the border are paying close to a 20% royalty and are forced to give PEMEX a 20%
stake in the venture as it is transboundary. The lack of current guidance documents for the
2012 Agreement and the “youth” of the rules and regulations in the newly reformed
Mexican hydrocarbons sector, including within the understaffed and overworked new
executive agencies, leave little to be desired for producers on the U.S. side of the boundary.
Because there is no forced unitization and a licensee can unilaterally exploit the
transboundary resources with little transboundary regulations on their activities, there is
little incentive for operators on the U.S. side to unitize and become involved in the Mexico
petroleum industry.
2. Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulations
Though it is similar to the Framework Agreement, the 2012 Agreement does not
actually create any safety or environmental protections. The 2012 Agreement only makes
broad mandates giving Executive Agencies the power and responsibility to create rules,
regulations, procedures, and processes that each country will abide by and fulfill in
cooperation. However, with the history of safety and environmental disasters—such as
Deepwater Horizon and the Ixtoc spill—the 2012 Agreement would likely be more
effective had it drafted binding rules and regulations, or more specific goals, instead of
simply aspiring for healthy and environmentally friendly exploitation of the resources. The
2012 Agreement is also deficient in that it does not clarify which set of laws is to govern
in certain transboundary areas. In developing transboundary reservoirs in the North Sea,
the understood practice is to comply with whichever country’s standards are stricter and
provide more protections over the health and safety of workers and over the environment
they operate in. There is no such written clause in the 2012 Agreement, nor history of
industry custom or norms that would indicate similar operation in the Gulf of Mexico. If
the countries were to agree to a similar compliance standard, it would still be problematic,
as the regulatory agencies in Mexico are newer with fewer resources and would likely have
difficulty complying with the U.S.’s burdensome regulations. The 2012 Agreement’s
provisions mandating the parties to create standards, alone, are insufficient: “Unless
implemented and enforced, they have no effect.”426 The successful implementation of the
2012 Agreement with regard to health, safety, and environmental goals will depend on the
collaboration of both countries to set regulations and procedures in place, and to agree upon
common standards of compliance.
426

Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo Disaster: Business as Usual or Sea
Change?, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 147, 153 (2014).

66

The history of the two regions are similar in that a devastating disaster led to
exhaustive analyses and reports, which demonstrated the need for system-wide changes in
the regulatory approach of each country. This change is not just important in considering
reforms the country implemented immediately following a disaster, but how it provided
for long-term success by shifting approaches and creating new cultures. Prior to both Piper
Alpha in the North Sea and Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, companies in both
regions adhered to prescriptive regulatory regimes, which specified technologies, practices,
and procedures to be used. The nature, magnitude, and duration of each spill resulting from
the disasters demonstrated the blatant inadequacies in the current safety cultures, where
complacency was negligent. Upon studying the causes of both disasters, it became evident
that a prescriptive regulatory regime in the context of offshore drilling in the deepest waters
may not be the best approach. The prescriptive approach proved inadequate because the
regulations lagged behind the newest and safest equipment and practices, the regulations
could not cover all behaviors that influence safety culture, and the regulators bore the
largest burden for inspecting facilities to affirm safety standards were being met. The North
Sea’s shift from a prescriptive approach to a goal-setting approach is seen as best-in-class
across the world. In both the U.K. and Norway, “the previous prescriptive regulatory
approach evolved into one where regulations were supplemented with a requirement for
companies to demonstrate to the regulator that they had undertaken a thorough assessment
of risks associated with an activity and they had adequate safety and risk management
systems to address those risks.”427 The prescriptive approach was seen as “fundamentally
reactive and therefore incapable of driving continuous improvement in policies and
practices.”428 The players in the Gulf of Mexico have taken some positive steps in shifting
to a goal-setting approach, including their implementation of SEMS and the collaboration
between BSEE and ASEA in creating and enforcing the SEMS. However, the Gulf of
Mexico is far from a pure goal-setting approach and still employs prescriptive regulations.
Both regions have also taken positive steps in ensuring there are no conflicts of
interest in the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing health, safety, and
environmental measures of the offshore oil and gas sector. In the U.K., following Piper
Alpha, the government created a new agency to separate the revenue-generating function—
interested in increasing profits and efficiency—from the health, safety, and environmental
function—which should place safety measures and environmentally-friendly operations
above other goals, even financial ones. Similarly, in the United States, the government
427

DEEPWATER HORIZON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 288, at 69.

428

Id.

67

dissolved the MMS—which was responsible for both generating revenue by collecting
royalties and ensuring operators comply with safety and environmental standards—and
created three separate agencies, each with clear and different mandates to avoid conflicting
interests. Mexico has also made progress in this area by creating agencies to oversee
healthy and safety compliance, where previously that responsibility rested in the stateowned monopoly, PEMEX—a clear conflict of interest.
One notable difference between health, safety, and environmental regulations in the
two regions concerns incentives for compliance and liability for harm caused. In the North
Sea, the main driver for operators to ensure compliance with regulations and their own
safety case is the potential for unlimited civil and criminal liability.429 It is essentially a
strict liability industry. The operator is liable for everything that happens on location, which
includes health and safety issues, environmental disasters, workers compensation claims,
and disputes with contractors.430 In addition, operators can face criminal liability for some
of their actions, especially in the case of environmental damage.431 This liability potential
is enough to keep operators accountable for their actions and enforcement protocols. In the
United States, on the other hand, the Oil Pollution Act sets a cap on liability damages at
$75 million, and although private parties may bring suit for harm caused to their property
or under environmental statutes’ citizen provisions, financial liability is hardly an incentive
for compliance for U.S. offshore oil and gas operators. The lack of financial liability is also
due in part to the prescriptive regulatory regime on which the United States still primarily
depends: the prescriptive approach “put[s] the risk—legal and moral—onto the regulator
to accommodate changing technology, geology, and location, rather than onto the operator,
where the responsibility rightly belonged.”432 Where the prescriptive approach creates no
risk-based incentives, the safety-management model shifted the burden on the industry “to
assess the risks associated with offshore activities and demonstrate that each facility had
the policies, plans, and systems in place to manage those risks.”433 Shifting to a risk
framework would avoid these challenges and mirror what other countries have adopted to
regulate their oil drilling.
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3. Conflict Resolution
As discussed previously, the Framework Agreement and the 2012 Agreement have
similarities and differences. With respect to conflict resolution, the United States and
Mexico could glean some effective methods from the Framework Agreement, although the
cultures are very different. What works in the North Sea may not necessarily work in the
Gulf of Mexico, due to cultural differences regarding litigation, the use of ADR techniques
such as arbitration agreements, and the overall corporate environment in the respective
countries.
Professional relationships between oil and gas companies in the North Sea are
markedly different than those in the Gulf of Mexico. The companies in the North Sea have
a long history of working together for decades, and an understanding that there are a limited
number of oil and gas companies. Companies recognize there will be future agreements
between the entities going forward, which motivates companies to resolve conflict in a
much more congenial and less litigious matter from the start. The relationships in the
United States and Mexico are somewhat more adversarial in nature, mostly due to the
corporate environment the United States has established. U.S. culture is more capitalist
minded, which inherently breeds a culture of self-interest and “every man for himself.” The
relationships that are established between companies can be congenial and professional,
however there is not as much collaboration in the United States and Mexico system as there
is in the North Sea. If the United States and Mexico could work toward a more collaborative
culture, the environment in the oil and gas industry would likely improve dramatically and
become much more efficient.
Because of the culture of collaboration and collegiality between U.K. companies,
many of the disputes never rise to the level of a formal claim or complaint. When these
situations arise, however, the vast majority of claims are solved in litigation as opposed to
some form of ADR. The system of justice in the United States would not be able to handle
the stress of the number of claims resulting in litigation via the U.K. process. This would
clog an already stressed system beyond what the system could handle. Access to the justice
system would decrease dramatically and the time to resolution would get exponentially
longer. The United States has been faster to adopt more ADR methods, in an effort to help
increase access to the courts and decrease time to resolution, and the popularity of ADR
methods has been consistently increasing. This is one area in which the Framework
Agreement may be able to learn from the United States, in terms of moving away from
litigation (in the unlikely event disputes rise to that level) and requiring more methods of
dispute resolution, including mediation and arbitration.
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The Framework Agreement and 2012 Agreement both have an oversight body, but
the two function differently. The 2012 Agreement has a Joint Commission, which is the
first line of defense in conflict resolution. However, the makeup of the Commission (per
the agreement) is one representative from each party, and one alternate from each party,
making it possible for an impasse to occur. Currently, the representatives are from BOEM
and the Hydrocarbons Commission, neither of whom are neutral parties to a potential
dispute. Additionally, arbitration is not binding, and the parties may continue the activities
being disputed. In fact, the agreement states the parties “may” go to arbitration, whereby
giving the parties a way to avoid arbitration altogether. The Framework Agreement
prescribes a Conciliation Board, which consists of five members (two from each side and
one chosen by both sides). The Conciliation Board, unlike the Joint Commission, is only
engaged if the government cannot reach an appropriate resolution to the issues at hand.
This is a better approach than the Joint Commission, which can become deadlocked very
easily with only two members.
Additionally, the U.K. does have binding arbitration in some of its agreements, but
arbitration is rarely used. Because of the culture of collaboration and partnership within the
oil and gas sector in the North Sea, use of arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution
(other than litigation) are not widely used. In the United States and Mexico, however,
arbitration is becoming a much more popular form of dispute resolution, and should be
binding on the parties if there is going to be an arbitration clause in the treaty.
The use of ADR is becoming more popular around the world. Many countries are
including contract language to require arbitration prior to any litigation to increase
efficiency and decrease the amount of time to final resolution. Some commercial contracts
in the U.K. and Scotland do have some form of an arbitration clause in the contracts, which
is fully binding on both parties; however, it is not widely used. The 2012 Agreement has
arbitration language in the agreement, but it is not mandatory, nor is it binding. Since the
2012 Agreement does not require arbitration or bind the parties to the ruling, there is little
incentive to exercise the arbitration process. Including an arbitration clause into the 2012
Agreement would be a step towards a culture shift away from litigation and towards an
alternative dispute resolution process. When added to the treaty, the clause will bind both
parties to the ruling and require parties to attempt to resolve the conflict outside the
courtroom.
One item noticeably absent from the 2012 Agreement, but is a part of the overall
Mexican law, is the concept of “administrative rescission.” This concept, as explained
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previously, allows the Mexican government to rescind contracts currently in place, and has
exercised this authority in the past. This process certainly provides a barrier to entry into
the oil and gas market in Mexico, as many non-Mexican companies will be concerned with
the ability of the government to step in and cancel existing contracts. By not including this
in the 2012 Agreement, it serves as a positive step in the relationship between the United
States and Mexico. In contrast, neither Scotland nor the U.K. have anything similar to an
“administrative rescission” process, which would not fit with the culture of collaboration
and partnership currently in existence.
The 2012 Agreement can improve its language with respect to conflict resolution.
Clearly identifying a path to resolution by requiring binding arbitration will remove much
of the confusion and continued conflict between the parties. Setting clear expectations for
both sides in the way to arbitration panels, which parties get to select the panel members,
and other rules and processes around the arbitration clause would help give the parties a
much more concrete picture of how future disputes will be handled and resolved.
4. Implementing Guidelines
Aside from the differences in the words and procedures of actual agreements, the
executive agencies in the United States and Mexico have yet to produce guidance
documents to provide further clarification. The U.K. and Norway have written guidance
documents that provide significant insight into the intended procedures. These guidance
documents give operators, international oil companies, the executive agencies, and the
licensees themselves a clear practical guide to navigating the process of producing a
transboundary field. Mexico and the United States, on the other hand, have yet to provide
these documents.
Though the United States and Mexico created a working group to draft guidelines,
the group has yet to address the various gaps in the 2012 Agreement and to create
supplementary guidelines. All relevant parties need to be involved in the creation of these
documents so that there are no missing issues or unfilled gaps. The interested groups
include: representatives from the Department of Interior, representatives from relevant
Mexican governmental bodies, and delegates from associations that represent oil and gas
companies, such as the American Petroleum Institute.
Having clear guidelines for businesses to follow when investing in transboundary
fields help ensure the treaty is implemented successfully. The guidelines at a minimum
should specify which agency is responsible for enforcing regulations at each step in the
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exploration and production process and where to find those specific current rules. Ideally,
the guidelines should also clarify the ambiguities from the 2012 Agreement. All relevant
agencies should publish such guidelines on their websites to provide easier access to the
material.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Transboundary resources do not respect manmade state boundaries. As such, in
order to efficiently develop these resources for the benefit of each state, the states who
share a maritime boundary have had to come together to develop a treaty governing this
area of development. Some states have been more successful in this venture than others.
The Framework Agreement between the U.K. and Norway is considered one of the most
successful agreements of its kind, and thus provides an excellent comparison to the 2012
Agreement between the United States and Mexico. Unlike the Framework Agreement, the
2012 Agreement is full of precatory, non-binding language and lackluster provisions that
provide little to no clear, concrete procedures while applying little to no binding force to
the parties. Though the 2012 Agreement was heavily debated in the U.S. Legislature, taking
two full years to pass, and was initially widely praised by the Mexican Government, upon
careful review and consideration, it fails to live up to expectations. It is unclear how the
2012 Agreement will play out in practice, but it might soon be tested, as multiple deepwater blocks along the maritime boundary have recently been licensed. Here's to hoping
the 2012 Agreement works better than it reads.
VII.

KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

CLARIFYING THE 2012 AGREEMENT – The state executive agencies should jointly create
and issue guidance documents to help clarify the 2012 Agreement and consolidate online
resources related to the various phases of offshore oil and gas projects. Guidance document
should include clear and concise information on:
 Guidance for the initial steps in entering into an agreement and selecting unit
operators;
 Guidance for the process of determining the initial volume and allocation of the
reserve between the states;
 Guidance on exploration drilling based on if drilling is initiated on the US or
Mexico side of the border and the relevant permitting and health, safety, and
environmental guidelines for explorative drilling;
 Guidance for the use of joint facilities, or the use of state installations—including
pipeline—to effectuate efficient transboundary production;
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Guidance on flaring, discharge, marine pollution responses, and other
environmental concerns;
Guidance on dispute resolution methods;
Guidance on decommissioning;
A clear listing of the executive agencies, both U.S. and Mexican, and their
jurisdiction/ duties in transboundary fields

COMPETENT AGENCIES –
● Mexico should continue to improve their new executive agencies and strive to
adequately staff and train their employees.
● To prevent a return of the troubles caused by union power and corruption within
PEMEX, neutral parties should be included on the board to ensure clear lines of
communication and that PEMEX is making transparent and ethical business
decisions.
● Because of the multiple agencies involved in Mexico’s offshore industry, compared
to the U.S.’s BOEM, Mexico should clarify the job of each agency and limit their
responsibilities to make them more efficient.
LICENSING STRUCTURE – Mexico should consider changing their licensing structure to
include minimum participation requirements based on the financial and technological
capability of the potential licensee.
UNITIZATION – Unitization of the field for efficient resource development is crucial to the
success of any transboundary agreement.
● The states should highly encourage, and incentivize, any currently operative or “up
and coming” fields not bound to the 2012 Agreement to voluntarily enter into a
unitization agreement as to honor the sovereignty of both states in their resources.
● To reduce the likelihood of conflicts, a “Unitization and Unit Operating
Agreement” should be required under the 2012 Agreement as opposed to the
current “Unitization Agreement” and separate “Unit Operating Agreement.”
● The 2012 Agreement should require that a unitization agreement is reached before
formal drilling activities can began.
● The 2012 Agreement should emphasize the international doctrine of good faith and
fair dealing regarding negotiations for a unitization agreement.
● The 2012 Agreement should emphasize the international doctrine of mutual
restraint if the parties cannot come to an agreement.
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● If PEMEX is required to have any involvement in transboundary fields, or Mexico
any national component, this needs to be clearly stated in the agreement, not hidden
in the fine print of the Energy Reform.
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL – A shift in the health, safety, and environmental
approach to regulating transboundary reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico is necessary to meet
world-class standards and to prevent future harm to human safety and the environment.
● The United States should implement new legislation mirroring the safety-case
approach used in Norway and the U.K., as opposed to enacting reactionary
regulations that are subject to the pendulum swings of new administrations.
● The 2012 Agreement should be amended to provide which country’s health, safety,
and environmental regulations control in transboundary reservoirs. In the
alternative, the Executive Agencies under the 2012 Agreement should create new
guidelines agreeing upon one standard that both countries will comply with. The
controlling standard should be whichever of the two is more protective.
● BSEE and ASEA should continue to collaborate in creating and enforcing SEMS
that can cohesively operate in both countries and in transboundary regions. The
agencies should also continue to cooperate in their bilateral efforts to enhance
safety and environmental regulations by creating new guidelines with clear
standards.
● The MEXUS Plan should be implemented in a way that allows for cross-border
support of oil pollution clean ups, instead of requiring each country to clean up its
side of the border.
● The United States and Mexico should eliminate the liability cap on operators and
mirror the strict liability scheme prevalent in the North Sea in order to place the
burden on operators, as opposed to regulators, and creative incentives for operators
to avoid external costs.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION – The approach to conflict resolution needs to be significantly
clarified and strengthened to ensure predictability, efficiency, and alignment with
international standards.
● The 2012 Agreement should provide clear guidelines on the acceptable forms and
sequence of dispute resolution mechanisms.
● The Joint Commission should be restructured to closely align with the Conciliation
Board in the Framework Agreement. Specifically, the Joint Commission should be
comprised of five members, including a neutral party.
● The 2012 Agreement should provide for the use of multiple forms of ADR,
including conciliation, mediation, expert determination, and arbitration.
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● Arbitration under the 2012 Agreement should align with international standards by
specifically stating that arbitral awards are final and binding on all parties.
● The 2012 Agreement should adopt institutional rules to govern arbitration.
Additionally, the arbitration provision should specify the following: the size,
composition, and selection of the arbitral panel; the choice of law governing the
dispute; and the seat and language of the arbitration.
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